Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Good River Farms and Martin Marietta Materials and TXI Operations, who own land directly across from each other along the Colorado River. In 2015, a "120-year flood" event occurred near Austin, Texas, causing severe damage to Good River's pecan farm. Good River claimed that Martin Marietta's strip mining activities resulted in a large pit filled with groundwater that breached and released a deluge of impounded surface water onto their property. Following a jury trial, Good River was awarded $659,882.00 in damages, prevailing on claims for violations of Texas Water Code § 11.086 and for negligence. Martin Marietta appealed the decision.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The jury rejected Good River's nuisance claims but found in favor of Good River on the issues of water diversion and negligence. The trial court entered final judgment on that verdict, awarding Good River $659,882.00 in damages. Martin Marietta filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), which the trial court denied.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusions that Martin Marietta violated Texas Water Code § 11.086 and committed common law negligence. The court noted that the jury verdict demands deference and that the unique factual scenario presented in this case supported the jury's conclusions. View "Good River Farms v. TXI Operations" on Justia Law

The case involves T & C Construction Services and Theodore Miller (collectively, T & C), who operate a rental building in St. Albans, West Virginia. The City of St. Albans inspected the premises after a tenant reported a fire, revealing numerous fire hazards and building code violations. The City issued two citations for these violations, and the St. Albans Municipal Court fined T & C $81,250.00 for the fire code violations and $116,900.00 for the building code violations. After T & C failed to appeal these orders, the City sought enforcement in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County issued a cease-and-desist order that enjoined T & C from operating its rental business on the premises, granted the City a money judgment for the criminal fines, and appointed a special commissioner to sell the property to satisfy the judgment. T & C appealed this enforcement order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to grant injunctive relief, rejecting T & C’s challenges to the injunctive relief. The court found that the lower court had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. However, the court reversed the lower court's appointment of a special commissioner to sell the property. The court held that the issuance and return of a writ of fieri facias showing “no property found” is a precondition to a circuit court’s jurisdiction to order the sale of a debtor’s property to satisfy a judgment for a criminal fine. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T & C Construction Services, LLC v. City of St. Albans" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two neighboring landowners, David W. Axelrod, as Trustee of the David W. Axelrod Family Trust, and Reid Limited Partnership (RLP), over real property and easement rights. Axelrod purchased a property in Teton County in 2003, which was not accessible by road. Michael Reid, who owned and operated an organic dairy farm on land owned by RLP, leased land adjacent to Axelrod's property. Axelrod built an access road through the RLP property, which led to a series of disputes between the parties. In 2017, Axelrod filed a lawsuit seeking clarification about his easement rights. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which required Axelrod to build a new road along a different easement and Reid to pay for the installation of a cattle guard. However, disagreements arose over the placement and cost of the cattle guard, leading to further litigation.The district court granted Axelrod's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Axelrod did not have an express easement for use of the RLP Easement, but he did have an easement by estoppel. The court also found that Reid had breached the settlement agreement by failing to pay for the cattle guard. Reid appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part and vacated it in part. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Reid and the dismissal of RLP's counterclaims for conversion and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court also affirmed the judgment on Axelrod's breach of contract claim and the refusal to allow amendment of the pleadings to add Reid Family Limited Partnership as a party. However, the court vacated the dismissal of RLP's trespass claim and the award of attorney fees to Axelrod against RLP, remanding for further proceedings. View "Axelrod v. Reid Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Pamela Antosh and Ned Lashley, who challenged the Village of Mount Pleasant's use of its eminent-domain power to acquire their property for road improvements associated with the private Foxconn development. In state court, the plaintiffs contested only the amount of compensation they were owed, not the propriety of the taking. However, when the state court ruled against them on an evidentiary issue two years into litigation, they decided to try their luck in federal court. In their federal complaint, they alleged for the first time that the taking was improper because it served a private purpose, not a public one.The state court proceedings were stayed pending the resolution of the federal suit. The Village filed a motion to dismiss the federal complaint, arguing that the federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over the proceeding. The district court agreed, dismissing the federal claims without prejudice, citing Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The plaintiffs appealed this judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court was correct to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the federal claims. The court concluded that the federal and state actions were parallel and that exceptional circumstances justified the district court's decision to abstain. The court noted that the plaintiffs' litigation strategy signaled a lack of respect for the state's ability to resolve the issues properly before its courts. The court also found that the plaintiffs' federal suit was a strategic attempt to bypass an unfavorable state-court ruling two years into that litigation. View "Antosh v. Village of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law

A real estate developer, Audthan LLC, and property owner, Nick & Duke, LLC (N & D), entered into a 40-year lease agreement in 2013 to replace a Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotel with a mixed-use residential and commercial building. The agreement required approval from the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) due to a previous harassment finding against the property. The lease required Audthan to obtain a "cure" agreement from HPD and develop low-income housing on the site. However, disagreements arose over the terms of the cure agreement and the parties disputed who was at fault for the termination of the ground lease.The Supreme Court dismissed parts of Audthan's complaint, including a claim for anticipatory repudiation based on N & D's refusal to sign any cure agreement, and rejected N & D's motion to dismiss the remaining portions of the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, holding that Audthan could not seek separate redress for anticipatory repudiation based on the same conduct that allegedly breached the contract in 2015.The Court of Appeals of New York disagreed with the lower courts' dismissal of Audthan's claim for anticipatory repudiation. The court held that a claim for breach and a claim for anticipatory repudiation could both be stated based on the facts at the pleading stage. The court found that N & D's refusal to sign the 2015 cure agreement could be seen as falling short of its contractual requirements without amounting to a total breach. However, N & D's 2021 statement that it would never sign any agreement could be seen as a clear and unequivocal statement that N & D would never perform its obligations, constituting a repudiation of the contract. The court modified the Appellate Division's order by denying N & D's motion to dismiss in part, affirmed the order as modified, and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Audthan LLC v Nick & Duke, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation brought a suit against the United States, alleging various claims concerning water rights and water-related infrastructure. The Tribe claimed that the United States breached duties of trust by mismanaging water rights and infrastructure held by the United States and operated for the Tribe, breached contracts with the Tribe, and effected unconstitutional takings of the Tribe’s property. The Claims Court dismissed all the breach of trust claims, held that one breach of contract claim was barred by a 2012 settlement agreement, and found the remaining breach of contract and takings claims time barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the Claims Court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the Winters doctrine and the 1899 Act did not sufficiently establish trust duties to support Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction with respect to the Tribe’s claims that the United States has a duty to construct new infrastructure and secure new water for the Tribe. However, the Court found that the 1906 Act imposes trust duties on the United States sufficient to support a claim at least with respect to management of existing water infrastructure. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of one breach of contract claim, vacated and remanded another, and affirmed the dismissal of the takings claims. View "UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN RESERVATION v. US" on Justia Law

A group of developers, collectively referred to as "The Preserve," entered into an agreement in 2011 to purchase land in Richmond, Rhode Island, with the intention of operating an outdoor shooting range and gun club. The town council and planning board initially supported the project, but a subsequent zoning ordinance amendment prohibited such uses. The Preserve was not notified of these changes. In 2016, a new zoning district was created, once again permitting indoor and outdoor shooting ranges. The Preserve claimed that the two-year delay caused substantial revenue loss. They also alleged that the town imposed arbitrary fees, delayed the approval process, and engaged in other discriminatory practices that increased their costs and hindered their development efforts.The Superior Court dismissed The Preserve's claims for violations of substantive due process, tortious interference with contract and prospective business advantages, civil liability for crimes and offenses, and a violation of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The court found that the claims were either barred by the statute of limitations or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the claims for civil liability for crimes and offenses and civil RICO were barred by a three-year statute of limitations because they were considered torts. The court also found that the statute of limitations was not tolled for the tortious interference claims, as the harm allegedly present was merely the consequence of separate and distinct acts that had occurred prior to the final approval of the land development for the resort. Therefore, all of The Preserve's claims were time-barred. View "The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC v. Kenyon" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over unpaid rent for a department store in an Illinois mall. The store was operated by CPS Partnership, which leased the retail space from WEC 98C-3 LLC. Saks Inc. guaranteed that it would pay the rent if CPS could not. However, when CPS stopped paying rent, Saks did not make any payments to WEC. This led to WEC defaulting on its mortgage, and the property was purchased by 4 Stratford Square Mall Holdings, LLC (“Stratford”) at a foreclosure auction. Initially, WEC sued Saks for damages. Later, Stratford intervened with its own claim for damages. The district court ruled only on Stratford’s claim for unpaid rent, finding that it was entitled to payment from Saks.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Saks argued that Stratford lacked standing to sue, that the district court erred in certifying its judgment for immediate appeal, and that the district court erred in rejecting Saks’s affirmative defenses. The appellate court found that Stratford did have standing to sue Saks, and the district court properly certified its judgment for appeal. On the merits, the appellate court concluded that Saks could not mount any of its desired defenses as it had waived its right to present affirmative defenses to liability in the guaranty that it signed. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "WEC 98C-3 LLC v. SFA Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

Vandercar, L.L.C. entered into a $36 million purchase contract for the Millennium Hotel in Cincinnati and then assigned its interest in the hotel to the Port of Greater Cincinnati Development Authority. The agreement stipulated that the Port would pay Vandercar a $5 million redevelopment fee if the Port issued bonds to redevelop the hotel within a year of its acquisition. The Port acquired the hotel and issued acquisition bonds, but it denied that the bonds were for redevelopment of the hotel, so it refused to pay the redevelopment fee. Vandercar sued the Port for breach of contract for failing to pay the redevelopment fee and also moved for prejudgment interest.The trial court found that Vandercar was entitled to the redevelopment fee and granted Vandercar’s motion for summary judgment on that issue. However, the trial court denied Vandercar’s motion for prejudgment interest, concluding that prejudgment interest could not be imposed on the Port since it was “an arm/instrumentality of the state.” Both parties appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decisions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The court held that the Port, a port authority created under R.C. 4582.22(A), is not exempt from the application of R.C. 1343.03(A), which entitles a creditor to prejudgment interest when the creditor receives a judgment for the payment of money due under a contract. Therefore, the Port may be held liable to pay prejudgment interest. The court remanded the case to the trial court to evaluate Vandercar’s motion for prejudgment interest under the correct standard. View "Vandercar, L.L.C. v. Port of Greater Cincinnati Development Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Outfront Media LLC (Outfront), a company that entered into a contract with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) to advertise on outdoor signs owned by the MBTA. The city of Boston assessed real estate tax for fiscal year 2021 on Outfront for the signs. Outfront sought an abatement of the tax, arguing that the signs were exempt from taxation under § 24. The city denied Outfront's claim for abatement, and Outfront appealed to the Appellate Tax Board (board), which upheld the tax assessment.The Appellate Tax Board upheld the city of Boston's tax assessment on Outfront Media LLC for the use of outdoor advertising signs owned by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). Outfront had argued that the signs were exempt from taxation under § 24, but the board disagreed, leading to Outfront's appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The court held that Outfront's use of the MBTA's outdoor advertising signs to post advertisements and generate advertising revenue constituted a "use" of the MBTA's property "in connection with a business conducted for profit" under § 24. The court distinguished such businesses from those merely providing a service for the MBTA such as a janitorial service. Therefore, Outfront used the signs within the meaning of § 24 and the decision of the board was upheld. View "Outfront Media LLC v. Board of Assessors of Boston" on Justia Law