Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

A young music producer created an instrumental hip-hop beat and uploaded it online without first obtaining a copyright. After hearing a similar beat in a popular song by a well-known rapper, he registered a sound recording copyright for his track and later sued the rapper for copyright infringement, seeking damages and an injunction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had copied his digital recording, but did not obtain a musical composition copyright, which would have protected the underlying musical elements.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, both parties failed to comply with local rules regarding summary judgment filings. The district court, exercising its discretion, chose not to penalize either side for these procedural lapses. On the merits, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had duplicated the actual digital sound recording, as opposed to merely imitating the musical composition. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court also awarded costs to the defendant but denied his request for attorney’s fees, finding the plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous or objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decisions on all issues. The appellate court held that, for a sound recording copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must present evidence of actual duplication of the digital recording, not just imitation of the musical composition. Because the plaintiff failed to provide such evidence, summary judgment for the defendant was proper. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s discretionary decisions regarding enforcement of local rules and denial of attorney’s fees. View "Richardson v. Kharbouch" on Justia Law

A former congressman created personalized videos for paying customers through the Cameo platform. A late-night television host, using fictitious names, requested and purchased several of these videos. The host then broadcast some of the videos on his show as part of a recurring segment that mocked the congressman by highlighting his willingness to say unusual things for money. The congressman claimed that this use of his videos infringed his copyrights and also violated state law through breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, reasoning that the television host’s use was transformative and did not harm the market for the original videos. The court also held that the state law claims were either preempted by the Copyright Act or failed to state a claim under applicable state law. Specifically, the court determined that the congressman was not a party to the relevant contract, failed to allege the essential terms of any implied contract, and did not plead any actual out-of-pocket loss for the fraudulent inducement claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, emphasizing the transformative nature of the use and the lack of market harm. The court also concluded that the state law claims failed to state a claim for relief, either because the congressman was not a party to the contract, did not allege an implied contract, or failed to allege actual damages. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full. View "Santos v. Kimmel" on Justia Law

A technology company developed and copyrighted a facial motion capture software system used in film production. The company’s assets, including the software, were transferred among several affiliated entities, leading to a disputed sale to a visual effects contractor. The contractor, after acquiring the assets under contested circumstances, used the software in the production of a major motion picture for a film studio. The studio’s contract with the contractor gave it broad rights to supervise the contractor’s work, including the right to terminate the contract for copyright infringement. During production, representatives of the studio were present at all relevant sessions where the software was used, and evidence was presented that copyright notices appeared during these sessions.After the film’s release, the technology company sued the studio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to the studio on the contributory infringement claim, finding insufficient evidence of the studio’s knowledge of infringement, but allowed the vicarious liability claim to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found the studio vicariously liable, awarded actual damages, and returned an advisory verdict on profits. The district court later granted judgment as a matter of law for the studio, concluding there was insufficient evidence that the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The court also struck the plaintiff’s jury demand on the issue of disgorgement of profits, holding there was no statutory right to a jury trial for that remedy, and excluded certain expert testimony and evidence of an indemnification agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings striking the jury demand on disgorgement of profits, excluding the damages expert’s testimony, and excluding the indemnification agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "REARDEN, LLC V. WALT DISNEY PICTURES" on Justia Law

Anna Biani participated in an online role-playing forum themed around Victorian London, where she created three original characters: Charlotte Émilie Benoit, Frederick FitzClarence, and Landon Otis Lloyd. She registered copyrights for these characters and her forum posts. Biani alleged that the television series Penny Dreadful, which aired on Showtime, infringed her copyrights by incorporating aspects of her characters into the show’s characters, particularly Vanessa Malcolm and Sir Malcolm Murray. She pointed to similarities in character traits, backgrounds, and the casting of Eva Green, whom she had identified as resembling one of her characters.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed Biani’s complaint. The court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, finding that Biani had not plausibly alleged that the defendants had access to her work or that the similarities between the characters were so striking as to preclude independent creation. The district court applied the extrinsic test for substantial similarity, filtering out unprotectable elements such as stock features of the Victorian-era genre, and concluded that any remaining similarities were insufficient. Biani was given leave to amend but chose not to do so, resulting in dismissal with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, to state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied protected aspects of the work. The court found that Biani failed to plausibly allege copying, as the similarities were not so extensive as to preclude coincidence or independent creation. Additionally, the court agreed that Biani did not allege substantial similarity in protectable expression under the extrinsic test. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "BIANI V. SHOWTIME NETWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

Two brothers, Tom and Robert Hoffmann, were formerly partners in a family heating and air conditioning business. After Robert bought out Tom’s interest, they settled their disputes in state court with an agreement that included a four-year prohibition on Tom’s use of the “Hoffmann” name in any HVAC business, as well as non-disparagement and non-solicitation clauses. After the four-year period, Tom started a new company, Hoffmann Air Conditioning & Heating, LLC, using the family name. Robert and his company, Hoffmann Brothers Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., objected and filed suit in federal court, alleging copyright infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Tom and his company on the copyright claim, finding insufficient evidence of damages or a causal link between the alleged infringement and any profits. The remaining claims proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a mixed verdict largely favoring Tom and his company on the trademark and unfair competition claims. Both sides sought attorney fees, but the district court denied all requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment on the copyright claim, holding that the evidence of damages and profits was too speculative. It also upheld the jury instructions and verdict on the trademark claims, finding the instructions properly reflected the law regarding customer sophistication and initial-interest confusion. The court agreed that ambiguity in the settlement agreement’s language about post-four-year use of the Hoffmann name was a factual question for the jury. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of attorney fees to Robert, as he had not personally incurred any fees. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects. View "Hoffmann Bros. Heating & Air v. Hoffmann Air & Heating" on Justia Law

A musician and songwriter alleged that another composer copied his liturgical song, “Emmanuel,” in creating her own work, “Christ Be Our Light.” The plaintiff had published and performed “Emmanuel” widely in the 1980s and early 1990s, including at conventions attended by both the defendant and her publisher. The defendant, a British musician, composed “Christ Be Our Light” in 1993, and her publisher had received copies of “Emmanuel” from the plaintiff in the mid-1980s. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had access to his work through these conventions, widespread dissemination, and her relationship with her publisher.The plaintiff initially filed suit in the Northern District of Indiana, but after a procedural dismissal and re-filing, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. During discovery, the plaintiff disclosed, after the deadline, letters from the publisher acknowledging receipt of “Emmanuel.” The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, excluded these letters and the related access theory as a sanction for late disclosure, finding the failure to disclose was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court then granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that, without the excluded evidence, the plaintiff could not show access or striking similarity, and thus could not proceed with his copyright claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the late-disclosed evidence and the related access theory, holding that the discovery sanction was not claim-dispositive and was within the district court’s discretion. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that, even without the excluded evidence, there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had access to “Emmanuel” and whether the two works were substantially or strikingly similar. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMBROSETTI V. OREGON CATHOLIC PRESS" on Justia Law

A graphic designer was commissioned in 2016 to create a room-sized artwork for a brewery’s exhibition at an annual fair produced by the defendant. The agreement specified that the designer would retain copyright ownership and that the installation could only be shown in person to paying patrons at the 2016 event. During the fair, the defendant created and widely disseminated marketing videos online featuring the designer’s work without attribution, despite the designer’s requests for credit. The designer applied for copyright registration in April 2017, and the work was eventually registered, though the exact date of registration is not in the record.The designer first filed a pro se copyright infringement suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in early 2018, but the court dismissed it without prejudice for failure to allege copyright registration. Instead of amending, the designer filed a second action in state court, which was removed to federal court. After amending her complaint, the district court again dismissed the copyright claims, this time with prejudice, for failure to state a plausible claim and failure to allege registration. The designer did not respond to the motion to dismiss. In December 2020, now represented by counsel, she filed the present suit in federal court, which was dismissed with prejudice on claim preclusion grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded for further consideration.On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, this time on both claim preclusion and statute of limitations grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the copyright infringement claims were untimely under the three-year statute of limitations, as the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged infringement by early 2017. The court also found no basis for equitable tolling. View "Foss v. Eastern States Exposition" on Justia Law

Several former members of the rock band Supertramp entered into a 1977 publishing agreement with their bandmates and manager, allocating specific percentages of songwriting royalties among themselves. These royalties were distributed according to the agreement for decades. In 2018, two of the principal songwriters and their publishing company stopped paying royalties to the plaintiffs, prompting the plaintiffs to file a breach of contract action. The dispute centered on whether the agreement could be unilaterally terminated or whether the obligation to pay royalties continued as long as the songs generated income.After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the court ruled as a matter of law that the defendants could terminate the agreement after a “reasonable time,” finding no express or implied duration in the contract. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which found in favor of the defendants, concluding that the contract had been terminated after a reasonable time. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied California contract law, which requires courts to first look for an express duration in the contract, then to determine if a duration can be implied from the contract’s nature and circumstances, and only if neither is found, to construe the duration as a reasonable time. The Ninth Circuit agreed there was no express duration but held that the contract’s nature implied a duration: the obligation to pay royalties continues as long as the songs generate publishing income, ending only when the copyrights expire and the works enter the public domain. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on liability. View "Thompson v. Hodgson" on Justia Law

Capstone Studios Corp., a copyright holder, sought to identify 29 subscribers of CoxCom LLC, an Internet service provider, whose IP addresses were allegedly used to share pirated copies of Capstone’s movie via the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. Capstone petitioned the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii to issue a subpoena under § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to compel Cox to disclose the subscribers’ identities. Cox notified its subscribers, and one, identified as “John Doe,” objected, claiming he had not downloaded the movie and that his Wi-Fi had been unsecured.A magistrate judge treated John Doe’s letter as a motion to quash the subpoena. The magistrate judge found that Cox’s involvement was limited to providing Internet access, qualifying it for the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which covers service providers acting solely as conduits for data transmission. The magistrate judge concluded that, as a matter of law, a § 512(h) subpoena cannot issue to a § 512(a) service provider. The district court adopted these findings and quashed the subpoena. Capstone’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and Capstone appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the DMCA does not permit a § 512(h) subpoena to issue to a service provider whose role is limited to that described in § 512(a), because such providers cannot remove or disable access to infringing content and thus cannot receive a valid notification under § 512(c)(3)(A), which is a prerequisite for a § 512(h) subpoena. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual finding that Cox acted only as a § 512(a) service provider. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order quashing the subpoena. View "In re Subpoena Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the rights to stage adaptations of Harper Lee's novel "To Kill a Mockingbird." In 1969, Lee granted The Dramatic Publishing Company (Dramatic) the exclusive rights to develop and license a stage adaptation of the novel for non-first-class productions. Decades later, Lee terminated this grant and authorized a new stage adaptation, with Atticus Limited Liability Company (Atticus) holding the rights to produce this second adaptation. Atticus sought a declaration from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that its performances did not infringe on any copyright interest held by Dramatic. Dramatic argued that it retained exclusive rights under the Copyright Act's derivative works exception and that Atticus's acquisition of rights was invalid.The district court rejected Dramatic's arguments, ruling in favor of Atticus and awarding it attorney's fees. Dramatic appealed the judgment on the merits and both parties cross-appealed the award of attorney's fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment granting declaratory relief to Atticus, holding that Dramatic's exclusive rights did not survive Lee's termination of the 1969 grant. The court found that the derivative works exception did not preserve Dramatic's exclusive license to stage non-first-class productions after the termination. The court also rejected Dramatic's arguments regarding the invalidity of the 2015 grant to Atticus and the timeliness of Atticus's claim.Regarding attorney's fees, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's award and remanded for further consideration. The court agreed that Dramatic's statute of limitations and res judicata arguments were objectively unreasonable but found that the district court erred in concluding that Dramatic had forfeited its statute of limitations defense and that its discovery requests unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny fees incurred before April 27, 2023, and declined to award Atticus its fees on appeal. View "Atticus Ltd. Liab. Co. v. The Dramatic Publ'g Co." on Justia Law