Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

The case concerns Frederick Allen, a videographer, and his company, Nautilus Productions, who documented the excavation of the Queen Anne’s Revenge, the sunken pirate ship of Blackbeard, off the North Carolina coast. Allen registered copyrights for many years of video footage he recorded during the recovery project. The State of North Carolina and its Department of Natural and Cultural Resources entered into agreements related to the salvage operation. Allen alleged that state officials infringed his copyrights by using his footage online and in state publications without permission, and that the state passed a law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-25(b), which Allen argued authorized this infringement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially dismissed some claims but allowed Allen’s claims for declaratory judgment and copyright infringement to proceed, finding Congress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the CRCA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Allen then voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims against the only non-governmental defendant, closing the case.Despite these rulings, the district court in 2021 allowed Allen to reopen the case, permitting him to amend his complaint based on a new constitutional theory stemming from United States v. Georgia, seeking as-applied, case-by-case abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In 2024, the district court denied sovereign immunity on this new claim, allowing it to proceed. The North Carolina defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in reopening the litigation under Rule 54(b) rather than Rule 60(b), where no extraordinary circumstances justified such relief. The appellate court reversed the order reopening the case, vacated the subsequent 2024 ruling as moot, and remanded with instructions to close the litigation and dismiss all claims against the North Carolina defendants with prejudice. View "Allen v. Stein" on Justia Law

A Kentucky high school intended to administer a mental-health survey to its students. Concerned about the survey’s contents, a parent requested a copy under the Kentucky Open Records Act, aiming to share it with other parents and reporters. The school denied her request, citing a provision of the state law that excludes records “prohibited by federal law or regulation” from disclosure, and argued that the survey was copyrighted by its publisher, NCS Pearson. The school did allow her to inspect the survey in person, but would not provide a copy.The parent, Miranda Stovall, did not pursue available state remedies, such as review by the Kentucky Attorney General or a state court appeal. Instead, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, seeking a declaratory judgment that releasing the survey would fall under the fair-use exception in federal copyright law. NCS Pearson moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court dismissed the case, finding that Stovall’s claim did not arise under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that federal jurisdiction was lacking because Stovall’s claim arose under state law, not the Copyright Act, and did not “necessarily raise” a substantial federal question. The court found that copyright law entered the dispute only as a defense to the state-law claim, and that potential future infringement actions did not establish Article III standing. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Stovall v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Vetter and Smith, co-wrote the song “Double Shot (Of My Baby’s Love)” in 1962 and assigned all copyright interests to Windsong Music Publishers in 1963, including a contingent assignment of renewal rights. After Smith died in 1972, his heirs and Vetter renewed the copyright when the original term ended in 1994. Windsong’s ownership of renewal rights depended on the authors’ survival; thus, Windsong received Vetter’s renewal rights because he survived, while Smith’s heirs received his share. Vetter Communications Corporation later purchased Smith’s heirs’ renewal rights. In 2019, Vetter terminated his earlier assignment under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), aiming to recapture his rights. The publisher’s ownership interests were subsequently sold to Resnik Music Group. When licensing negotiations arose for international use, conflicting ownership claims led Vetter and his corporation to seek a declaratory judgment establishing their sole copyright ownership worldwide.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denied Resnik’s motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court declared that Vetter was the sole owner of the recaptured copyright interest globally, and Vetter Communications Corporation was the sole owner of the renewal copyright interest globally, establishing their exclusive ownership.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that termination of copyright assignments under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) and the renewal provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909 confer worldwide ownership rights to the terminating author or their heirs, not limited to domestic rights. The court found that statutory text, context, and purpose support this interpretation, and that the judgment does not conflict with international treaty obligations or relevant legal principles. View "Vetter v. Resnik" on Justia Law

Athos Overseas Limited owns copyrights to numerous classic Mexican and Latin American films. The company discovered that its copyrighted films were posted on YouTube without authorization. Athos sent multiple takedown notices to YouTube, which removed the specific videos identified in those notices. However, Athos argued that YouTube’s technology—particularly its video-hashing and content management tools—gave it actual or “red flag” knowledge of additional infringing material beyond what was specifically identified, and thus YouTube should have removed all such matches automatically.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied Athos’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court found that YouTube qualified for safe-harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as it expeditiously removed infringing material identified by valid takedown notices and did not have actual or red flag knowledge of other specific infringements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that YouTube’s copyright management technologies do not, in themselves, give YouTube actual or red flag knowledge of specific infringing material unless a valid DMCA notice is received. The court also found that YouTube’s moderation and curation features did not constitute the right and ability to control infringing activity for purposes of the DMCA safe harbor. Therefore, YouTube was entitled to safe-harbor protection under § 512(c), and summary judgment in its favor was proper. View "Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc." on Justia Law

Two individuals who are heirs to the author of a 1983 magazine article about the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School, known as “Top Gun,” brought suit against a film studio. They alleged that a 2022 film, which is a sequel to an earlier movie inspired by the article, unlawfully copied their copyrighted work and breached a contractual obligation to credit the original author.After the 1983 article was published, the author assigned all rights to the studio in exchange for compensation and a promise that he would be credited in any movie “substantially based upon or adapted from” the article. The studio produced an initial film in 1986, which acknowledged the article. Decades later, the heirs terminated the copyright grant under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)—a statutory right for authors’ heirs. The studio released the sequel without crediting or compensating the heirs. The heirs filed claims for copyright infringement and breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the studio, finding that the new film did not share substantial amounts of the article’s original expression and excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion for failing to filter out unprotectable elements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the sequel did not share substantial similarity in protectable expression with the article, as required for copyright infringement. It also found no original and protectable selection and arrangement of elements, and concluded that the district court properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert and admitted the studio’s expert. The court further held that the studio did not breach the 1983 agreement, because the new film was not produced under the rights conferred by that agreement. The judgment for the studio was affirmed. View "YONAY V. PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed. View "Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from the design and installation of cabinetry in a luxury home in Charleston, South Carolina. Design Gaps, Inc., owned by David and Eva Glover, had a longstanding business relationship with Shelter, LLC, a general contractor operated by Ryan and Jenny Butler. After being dissatisfied with Design Gaps’ performance, the homeowners, Dr. Jason and Kacie Highsmith, and Shelter terminated their contract with Design Gaps and hired Distinctive Design & Construction LLC, owned by Bryan and Wendy Reiss, to complete the work. The Highsmiths and Shelter initiated arbitration against Design Gaps, which led to the arbitrator ruling in favor of the homeowners and Shelter on their claims, and against Design Gaps on its counterclaims, including those for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and unfair trade practices.After the arbitration, Design Gaps sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, but the court instead confirmed the award. Concurrently, Design Gaps filed a separate federal lawsuit against several parties, including some who were not part of the arbitration. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the new claims, or alternatively, that the claims failed on other grounds such as the statute of limitations and laches. The district court agreed, dismissing most claims based on preclusion or other legal bars, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar most of Design Gaps’ claims, even against parties not directly involved in the arbitration but in privity with those who were. For the remaining claims, the court found they were properly dismissed on grounds such as the statute of limitations, waiver, or laches. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Distinctive Design & Construction LLC" on Justia Law

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

A young music producer created an instrumental hip-hop beat and uploaded it online without first obtaining a copyright. After hearing a similar beat in a popular song by a well-known rapper, he registered a sound recording copyright for his track and later sued the rapper for copyright infringement, seeking damages and an injunction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had copied his digital recording, but did not obtain a musical composition copyright, which would have protected the underlying musical elements.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, both parties failed to comply with local rules regarding summary judgment filings. The district court, exercising its discretion, chose not to penalize either side for these procedural lapses. On the merits, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had duplicated the actual digital sound recording, as opposed to merely imitating the musical composition. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court also awarded costs to the defendant but denied his request for attorney’s fees, finding the plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous or objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decisions on all issues. The appellate court held that, for a sound recording copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must present evidence of actual duplication of the digital recording, not just imitation of the musical composition. Because the plaintiff failed to provide such evidence, summary judgment for the defendant was proper. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s discretionary decisions regarding enforcement of local rules and denial of attorney’s fees. View "Richardson v. Kharbouch" on Justia Law

A former congressman created personalized videos for paying customers through the Cameo platform. A late-night television host, using fictitious names, requested and purchased several of these videos. The host then broadcast some of the videos on his show as part of a recurring segment that mocked the congressman by highlighting his willingness to say unusual things for money. The congressman claimed that this use of his videos infringed his copyrights and also violated state law through breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, reasoning that the television host’s use was transformative and did not harm the market for the original videos. The court also held that the state law claims were either preempted by the Copyright Act or failed to state a claim under applicable state law. Specifically, the court determined that the congressman was not a party to the relevant contract, failed to allege the essential terms of any implied contract, and did not plead any actual out-of-pocket loss for the fraudulent inducement claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, emphasizing the transformative nature of the use and the lack of market harm. The court also concluded that the state law claims failed to state a claim for relief, either because the congressman was not a party to the contract, did not allege an implied contract, or failed to allege actual damages. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full. View "Santos v. Kimmel" on Justia Law