Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

Two individuals who are heirs to the author of a 1983 magazine article about the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School, known as “Top Gun,” brought suit against a film studio. They alleged that a 2022 film, which is a sequel to an earlier movie inspired by the article, unlawfully copied their copyrighted work and breached a contractual obligation to credit the original author.After the 1983 article was published, the author assigned all rights to the studio in exchange for compensation and a promise that he would be credited in any movie “substantially based upon or adapted from” the article. The studio produced an initial film in 1986, which acknowledged the article. Decades later, the heirs terminated the copyright grant under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)—a statutory right for authors’ heirs. The studio released the sequel without crediting or compensating the heirs. The heirs filed claims for copyright infringement and breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the studio, finding that the new film did not share substantial amounts of the article’s original expression and excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion for failing to filter out unprotectable elements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the sequel did not share substantial similarity in protectable expression with the article, as required for copyright infringement. It also found no original and protectable selection and arrangement of elements, and concluded that the district court properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert and admitted the studio’s expert. The court further held that the studio did not breach the 1983 agreement, because the new film was not produced under the rights conferred by that agreement. The judgment for the studio was affirmed. View "YONAY V. PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed. View "Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from the design and installation of cabinetry in a luxury home in Charleston, South Carolina. Design Gaps, Inc., owned by David and Eva Glover, had a longstanding business relationship with Shelter, LLC, a general contractor operated by Ryan and Jenny Butler. After being dissatisfied with Design Gaps’ performance, the homeowners, Dr. Jason and Kacie Highsmith, and Shelter terminated their contract with Design Gaps and hired Distinctive Design & Construction LLC, owned by Bryan and Wendy Reiss, to complete the work. The Highsmiths and Shelter initiated arbitration against Design Gaps, which led to the arbitrator ruling in favor of the homeowners and Shelter on their claims, and against Design Gaps on its counterclaims, including those for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and unfair trade practices.After the arbitration, Design Gaps sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, but the court instead confirmed the award. Concurrently, Design Gaps filed a separate federal lawsuit against several parties, including some who were not part of the arbitration. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the new claims, or alternatively, that the claims failed on other grounds such as the statute of limitations and laches. The district court agreed, dismissing most claims based on preclusion or other legal bars, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar most of Design Gaps’ claims, even against parties not directly involved in the arbitration but in privity with those who were. For the remaining claims, the court found they were properly dismissed on grounds such as the statute of limitations, waiver, or laches. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Distinctive Design & Construction LLC" on Justia Law

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

A young music producer created an instrumental hip-hop beat and uploaded it online without first obtaining a copyright. After hearing a similar beat in a popular song by a well-known rapper, he registered a sound recording copyright for his track and later sued the rapper for copyright infringement, seeking damages and an injunction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had copied his digital recording, but did not obtain a musical composition copyright, which would have protected the underlying musical elements.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, both parties failed to comply with local rules regarding summary judgment filings. The district court, exercising its discretion, chose not to penalize either side for these procedural lapses. On the merits, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had duplicated the actual digital sound recording, as opposed to merely imitating the musical composition. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court also awarded costs to the defendant but denied his request for attorney’s fees, finding the plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous or objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decisions on all issues. The appellate court held that, for a sound recording copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must present evidence of actual duplication of the digital recording, not just imitation of the musical composition. Because the plaintiff failed to provide such evidence, summary judgment for the defendant was proper. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s discretionary decisions regarding enforcement of local rules and denial of attorney’s fees. View "Richardson v. Kharbouch" on Justia Law

A former congressman created personalized videos for paying customers through the Cameo platform. A late-night television host, using fictitious names, requested and purchased several of these videos. The host then broadcast some of the videos on his show as part of a recurring segment that mocked the congressman by highlighting his willingness to say unusual things for money. The congressman claimed that this use of his videos infringed his copyrights and also violated state law through breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, reasoning that the television host’s use was transformative and did not harm the market for the original videos. The court also held that the state law claims were either preempted by the Copyright Act or failed to state a claim under applicable state law. Specifically, the court determined that the congressman was not a party to the relevant contract, failed to allege the essential terms of any implied contract, and did not plead any actual out-of-pocket loss for the fraudulent inducement claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, emphasizing the transformative nature of the use and the lack of market harm. The court also concluded that the state law claims failed to state a claim for relief, either because the congressman was not a party to the contract, did not allege an implied contract, or failed to allege actual damages. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full. View "Santos v. Kimmel" on Justia Law

A technology company developed and copyrighted a facial motion capture software system used in film production. The company’s assets, including the software, were transferred among several affiliated entities, leading to a disputed sale to a visual effects contractor. The contractor, after acquiring the assets under contested circumstances, used the software in the production of a major motion picture for a film studio. The studio’s contract with the contractor gave it broad rights to supervise the contractor’s work, including the right to terminate the contract for copyright infringement. During production, representatives of the studio were present at all relevant sessions where the software was used, and evidence was presented that copyright notices appeared during these sessions.After the film’s release, the technology company sued the studio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to the studio on the contributory infringement claim, finding insufficient evidence of the studio’s knowledge of infringement, but allowed the vicarious liability claim to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found the studio vicariously liable, awarded actual damages, and returned an advisory verdict on profits. The district court later granted judgment as a matter of law for the studio, concluding there was insufficient evidence that the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The court also struck the plaintiff’s jury demand on the issue of disgorgement of profits, holding there was no statutory right to a jury trial for that remedy, and excluded certain expert testimony and evidence of an indemnification agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings striking the jury demand on disgorgement of profits, excluding the damages expert’s testimony, and excluding the indemnification agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "REARDEN, LLC V. WALT DISNEY PICTURES" on Justia Law

Anna Biani participated in an online role-playing forum themed around Victorian London, where she created three original characters: Charlotte Émilie Benoit, Frederick FitzClarence, and Landon Otis Lloyd. She registered copyrights for these characters and her forum posts. Biani alleged that the television series Penny Dreadful, which aired on Showtime, infringed her copyrights by incorporating aspects of her characters into the show’s characters, particularly Vanessa Malcolm and Sir Malcolm Murray. She pointed to similarities in character traits, backgrounds, and the casting of Eva Green, whom she had identified as resembling one of her characters.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed Biani’s complaint. The court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, finding that Biani had not plausibly alleged that the defendants had access to her work or that the similarities between the characters were so striking as to preclude independent creation. The district court applied the extrinsic test for substantial similarity, filtering out unprotectable elements such as stock features of the Victorian-era genre, and concluded that any remaining similarities were insufficient. Biani was given leave to amend but chose not to do so, resulting in dismissal with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, to state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied protected aspects of the work. The court found that Biani failed to plausibly allege copying, as the similarities were not so extensive as to preclude coincidence or independent creation. Additionally, the court agreed that Biani did not allege substantial similarity in protectable expression under the extrinsic test. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "BIANI V. SHOWTIME NETWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

Two brothers, Tom and Robert Hoffmann, were formerly partners in a family heating and air conditioning business. After Robert bought out Tom’s interest, they settled their disputes in state court with an agreement that included a four-year prohibition on Tom’s use of the “Hoffmann” name in any HVAC business, as well as non-disparagement and non-solicitation clauses. After the four-year period, Tom started a new company, Hoffmann Air Conditioning & Heating, LLC, using the family name. Robert and his company, Hoffmann Brothers Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., objected and filed suit in federal court, alleging copyright infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Tom and his company on the copyright claim, finding insufficient evidence of damages or a causal link between the alleged infringement and any profits. The remaining claims proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a mixed verdict largely favoring Tom and his company on the trademark and unfair competition claims. Both sides sought attorney fees, but the district court denied all requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment on the copyright claim, holding that the evidence of damages and profits was too speculative. It also upheld the jury instructions and verdict on the trademark claims, finding the instructions properly reflected the law regarding customer sophistication and initial-interest confusion. The court agreed that ambiguity in the settlement agreement’s language about post-four-year use of the Hoffmann name was a factual question for the jury. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of attorney fees to Robert, as he had not personally incurred any fees. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects. View "Hoffmann Bros. Heating & Air v. Hoffmann Air & Heating" on Justia Law

A musician and songwriter alleged that another composer copied his liturgical song, “Emmanuel,” in creating her own work, “Christ Be Our Light.” The plaintiff had published and performed “Emmanuel” widely in the 1980s and early 1990s, including at conventions attended by both the defendant and her publisher. The defendant, a British musician, composed “Christ Be Our Light” in 1993, and her publisher had received copies of “Emmanuel” from the plaintiff in the mid-1980s. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had access to his work through these conventions, widespread dissemination, and her relationship with her publisher.The plaintiff initially filed suit in the Northern District of Indiana, but after a procedural dismissal and re-filing, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. During discovery, the plaintiff disclosed, after the deadline, letters from the publisher acknowledging receipt of “Emmanuel.” The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, excluded these letters and the related access theory as a sanction for late disclosure, finding the failure to disclose was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court then granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that, without the excluded evidence, the plaintiff could not show access or striking similarity, and thus could not proceed with his copyright claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the late-disclosed evidence and the related access theory, holding that the discovery sanction was not claim-dispositive and was within the district court’s discretion. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that, even without the excluded evidence, there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had access to “Emmanuel” and whether the two works were substantially or strikingly similar. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMBROSETTI V. OREGON CATHOLIC PRESS" on Justia Law