Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages.Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. View "Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc." on Justia Law

Members of the rap group 2 Live Crew, including Mark Ross, created five albums between 1986 and 1989. Through a written agreement, the group assigned the sound recording copyrights to Luke Records, a company owned by one of the group’s members. In 1995, following Luke Records’ bankruptcy, these copyrights were sold to Lil’ Joe Records. In 2000, Mark Ross filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; his termination interests in these copyrights were never listed or addressed in his bankruptcy proceedings. Years later, within the statutory window, Ross, another group member, and heirs of a third served a notice attempting to terminate the copyright grants to Luke Records, as permitted by the Copyright Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially concluded that Ross’s termination interests did not enter his bankruptcy estate, interpreting the Copyright Act and Bankruptcy Code to exclude them. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the effectiveness of the termination notice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury’s factual findings, the district court concluded the termination notice was valid. Lil’ Joe Records appealed the district court’s final judgment, the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Ross’s termination interests were property of his bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s inalienability restriction. Because these interests were never scheduled or administered by the bankruptcy court, they remained with the bankruptcy estate when Ross attempted to exercise them. As a result, Ross could not validly sign the termination notice, and the group did not have the required majority to terminate the copyright grants. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lil' Joe Records, Inc. v. Won" on Justia Law

George Bernard Worrell, Jr., a foundational member and arranger for the musical group Parliament-Funkadelic, collaborated with George Clinton and Thang, Inc. from 1969 to 1981. In 1976, Worrell was presented with a contract (the “1976 Agreement”) by Thang, Inc., which purported to grant Thang full ownership of sound recordings Worrell contributed to, in exchange for royalties. Over the years, Worrell and his estate asserted that Thang and Clinton failed to pay royalties due under this agreement. Worrell died in 2016, and his estate became the plaintiff in subsequent litigation.After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings. View "Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc." on Justia Law

A renowned photographer entered into a 2014 agreement with a licensing agency, granting it the exclusive worldwide right to license, market, and promote certain of her images. However, she reserved for herself the right to collaborate with or deliver these images to specific individuals or entities for special projects or other endeavors she deemed of interest. In subsequent years, the photographer took photographs for a magazine under agreements that reserved rights to her studio. The agency discovered that some of these photographs appeared on websites operated by the defendants and sued them for copyright infringement, supplying an authorization letter from the photographer permitting it to act on her behalf in matters relating to copyright infringement.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the defendants argued that the agency lacked statutory standing under the Copyright Act because it was not the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under the copyright. The district court agreed, finding that the photographer’s retention of certain rights in the agreement meant the agency did not have an exclusive license, and therefore lacked standing. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It also denied the agency’s late motion to amend the complaint to add the photographer as a co-plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court’s analysis was mistaken: the reservation of certain rights by the photographer did not automatically eliminate the agency’s ability to hold other exclusive rights. The appellate court vacated the summary judgment, affirmed the denial of the motion to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider the standing issue and the effect of the authorization letter in light of its opinion. View "Great Bowery Inc. v. Consequence Sound LLC" on Justia Law

A professional videographer recorded a video in 2015 showing Michael Jordan breaking up a fight. Years later, a hip-hop news website operated by a media company republished the entire video, embedding it from a social media post, and used a screenshot from the video as the background of the article’s headline. The same website also published two articles embedding a separate interview video that the videographer had recorded with rapper Melle Mel, which had been posted on YouTube. Both articles included screenshots from the interview as part of their headlines.The videographer sued the media company for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, finding that the use of the Jordan Video was fair use, the screenshots were de minimis and not actionable, and the embedding of the Melle Mel Video was permitted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the district court erred in determining, at the pleading stage, that the media company’s use of the entire Jordan Video was fair use, since it could substitute for the original and potentially harm the market for the video. The appellate court also found that the screenshots’ use was not de minimis because they were clearly recognizable and prominently displayed. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that embedding the Melle Mel Video from YouTube was permitted by the license granted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as to the Jordan Video and both sets of screenshots, affirmed as to the Melle Mel Video, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc." on Justia Law

DISH Network L.L.C. held exclusive rights to broadcast certain Arabic-language television channels in the United States, secured through written agreements with foreign content producers. The defendants operated businesses that provided U.S. customers with unauthorized access to these channels through internet streaming devices and services, bypassing DISH’s authorization and payments. The defendants’ services relied on content delivery networks and encoders to capture, transcode, and transmit live broadcasts of the protected channels to their customers in the U.S.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida first considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment for DISH regarding its ownership of valid copyrights but found factual disputes about infringement, leading to a bench trial. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of DISH, finding that the defendants' use of both content delivery networks and encoders constituted direct copyright infringement. The court awarded DISH a permanent injunction, $600,000 in statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The appellate court rejected all arguments by the defendants, including challenges to DISH’s ownership, the validity and transfer of the copyrights, and several evidentiary rulings. The court specifically found that the audiovisual works at issue were “Collective Works” under UAE law, supporting MBC’s initial ownership, and that the transfer of rights to DISH was uncontested by the original owner. The Eleventh Circuit held that sufficient evidence showed the defendants directly infringed DISH’s exclusive rights by operating encoders, and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Dish Network L.L.C. v. Fraifer" on Justia Law

A non-profit organization that develops and sells technical standards for use in industry brought suit against a for-profit company that operates an online library of building codes. The for-profit company published on its website the full text of several copyrighted standards developed by the non-profit, which had been incorporated by reference into the International Building Code. This building code, in turn, was adopted as law by the City of Philadelphia and other jurisdictions. The for-profit company made these incorporated standards freely available, though it also sold premium subscriptions for enhanced features. The non-profit derived significant revenue from licensing and selling its standards, including those incorporated into law, and did not authorize the copying.The case was first heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After limited discovery and a hearing, the District Court denied the non-profit’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the for-profit company was likely to succeed on its fair use defense. The District Court found that the company’s publication of the standards for the purpose of public access to the law was transformative, even though the use was commercial in part, and that the standards, as incorporated into law, were primarily factual in nature. The District Court also found that copying the entire standards was reasonable because the law incorporated those standards in full, and that the effect on the market for the standards was at best equivocal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit held that the for-profit company is likely to succeed on the merits of its fair use defense, as three of the four statutory fair use factors favored fair use and the fourth was equivocal. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "American Society for Testing & Materials v. UPCODES Inc" on Justia Law

Several major music copyright owners, including a leading entertainment company, sought to hold an Internet service provider responsible for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers. The service provider, which serves millions of customers, was notified by a monitoring company of over 160,000 instances where its subscribers’ IP addresses were linked to alleged copyright violations such as illegal music file sharing. Although the provider had policies prohibiting infringement and took steps such as issuing warnings and suspending service, the copyright holders argued these measures were inadequate and brought suit seeking to impose liability on the provider for continuing to serve known infringers.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. There, the jury found in favor of the copyright owners on both contributory and vicarious liability, and determined the provider’s infringement was willful, awarding $1 billion in statutory damages. After the District Court denied the provider’s post-trial motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding of contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a service with knowledge it would be used for infringement was sufficient. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed as to vicarious liability and remanded for a new determination of damages.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case concerning contributory liability. The Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it either induced the infringement or provided a service tailored for infringement. Because the provider neither encouraged infringement nor offered a service primarily designed for infringement—since Internet access has substantial lawful uses—the provider was not contributorily liable. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment on contributory liability and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law

A major music performing rights organization, which licenses the public performance of musical works to concert promoters, was unable to reach agreement with a national association of concert promoters on the rates and revenue base for blanket licenses covering live performances. For the first time in their relationship, the rights organization petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set the licensing terms, as permitted under an antitrust consent decree applicable to the organization due to its significant market share. The promoters’ association, whose members include the two largest concert promoters in the United States, has historically secured blanket licenses from multiple performing rights organizations to avoid copyright infringement.The district court accepted the organization’s proposed rates for a retroactive period and set a new, higher rate for a more recent period. It also broadened the definition of “gross revenues” for calculating royalties, including new categories such as revenues from ticket service fees, VIP packages, and box suites, which had not traditionally been included. The promoters’ association appealed these decisions, arguing that both the rates and the expanded revenue base were unreasonable. The rights organization cross-appealed the denial of prejudgment interest on retroactive payments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court imposed unreasonable rates, in part because it adopted an unprecedented and administratively burdensome revenue base without justification and relied too heavily on benchmark agreements that were not sufficiently comparable to prior agreements with the association. The court also found no economic changes justifying a significant rate increase. While it found no abuse of discretion in denying prejudgment interest, it vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. North American Concert Promoters Association" on Justia Law

A professional photographer discovered that between 2018 and 2022, hundreds of his photographs were uploaded to an online stock photo platform operated by a large digital content marketplace, without his permission. Three contributors to the platform were responsible for uploading these images, and the platform subsequently licensed many of them to customers, generating revenue shared with the uploaders. After being notified by the photographer’s attorney, the platform removed the images and terminated the contributor accounts, but the photographer filed suit alleging both copyright infringement and violations related to the removal and alteration of copyright management information (CMI).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the platform on all claims. The court concluded that the platform qualified for safe harbor immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) for the copyright infringement claims. For the CMI claims, the court found that the photographer failed to present evidence of the platform's required scienter (knowledge or intent) to sustain a violation under 17 U.S.C. § 1202.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the CMI claims, agreeing that there was no evidence the platform acted with the necessary scienter under § 1202(a) or (b). However, the appellate court vacated the grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claims. It held that factual disputes remained as to whether the infringing activity occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” and whether the platform had the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, both critical to safe harbor eligibility under the DMCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these factual questions. View "McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc." on Justia Law