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The initial six-month agreement between LimeCoral and CareerBuilder specified that all graphic designs created for CareerBuilder would constitute the exclusive property of CareerBuilder and said nothing about renewal fees. After six months, LimeCoral continued to prepare media files incorporating custom graphic designs, typically receiving $3,000 for each new design. As there was no longer a written agreement transferring ownership of the copyright, LimeCoral retained ownership and implicitly granted CareerBuilder a license to use the designs. CareerBuilder argued the license was unconditional and irrevocable; LimeCoral claimed it was subject to CareerBuilder’s alleged agreement to pay an annual renewal fee for every design that CareerBuilder continued to use. LimeCoral sued, alleging breach of copyright and breach of an alleged oral agreement to pay an annual renewal. The district court granted CareerBuilder summary judgment, finding that CareerBuilder had an irrevocable, implied license to use LimeCoral’s designs that was not conditioned upon any agreement to pay LimeCoral renewal fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that would permit the factfinder to conclude that there was an agreement between LimeCoral and CareerBuilder that LimeCoral would be paid a fee for each renewal, and that the implied license LimeCoral granted to CareerBuilder to use the job brandings was subject to that agreement. View "LimeCoral, Ltd. v. CareerBuilder, LLC" on Justia Law

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The district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Defendants in this case alleging various claims under Puerto Rico and federal law, including claims under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 505. Plaintiff sued Sony Corporation of America and other related defendants in connection with a songwriting contest that Sony had co-sponsored. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice on the grounds that they were subject to mandatory arbitration under an agreement that Plaintiff had signed upon entering the contest and that his claims were subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The First Circuit affirmed. Thereafter, Defendants moved for attorney’s fees under section 505 of the Copyright Act, which provides for attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. The district court granted the motion and awarded attorney’s fees. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Defendants did not qualify as prevailing parties under section 505. View "Cortes-Ramos v. Sony Corp. of America" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of copyright infringement claims brought by a monkey over selfies he took on a wildlife photographer's unattended camera. Naruto, a crested macaque, took several photos of himself on the camera, and the photographer and Wildlife Personalities subsequently published the Monkey Selfies in a book. PETA filed suit as next friend to Naruto, alleging copyright infringement. The panel held that the complaint included facts sufficient to establish Article III standing because it alleged that Naruto was the author and owner of the photographs and had suffered concrete and particularized economic harms; the monkey's Article III standing was not dependent on the sufficiency of PETA; but Naruto lacked statutory standing because the Copyright Act did not expressly authorize animals to file copyright infringement suits. Finally, the panel granted defendants' request for attorneys' fees on appeal. View "Naruto v. Slater" on Justia Law

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Oracle’s Java platform for computer programming allows programmers to write programs that “run on different types of computer hardware without having to rewrite them for each different type.” Java Application Programming Interface (API) is a collection of “pre-written Java source code programs for common and more advanced computer functions.” To include a particular function in a program, the programmer invokes the Java “declaring code,” and “implementing code,” which takes the input(s) and gives the computer step-by-step instructions to carry out the declared function. Oracle sued, alleging that Google’s unauthorized use of Oracle Java API packages in its Android operating system infringed Oracle’s copyrights, 17 U.S.C. 107(1). The Federal Circuit held that declaring code and the API packages' structure, sequence, and organization are entitled to copyright protection. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. At the second trial, Google prevailed on its fair use defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Google’s use of the Java API packages was not fair as a matter of law, and remanded for a trial on damages. Google’s commercial use of the API packages weighs against a finding of fair use. Google merely copied the material and moved it from one platform to another without alteration, not a transformative use. Given the evidence of actual and potential harm, “unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by” Google would result in “a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original” and its derivatives. View "Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case arose from a dispute between the parties over licensing agreements involving the motion picture Gone in 60 Seconds. The trial court entered judgment for Classic and ordered that Eleanor Licensing retain possession of a vehicle identified as "Eleanor No. 1," which had been manufactured by Classic pursuant to a licensing agreement between the parties; quieting title to the vehicle in Eleanor Licensing; directing Classic to perform according to the terms of the licensing agreement and transfered legal title to Eleanor No. 1 to Eleanor Licensing; and awarding damages and attorney fees. The court held that the November 1, 2007 License Agreement was supported by adequate consideration; the contract-based claims, to the extent otherwise valid, were barred by the statute of limitations; the causes of action for return of personal property and quiet title were timely filed; the alter ego finding was not supported by substantial evidence; Jason Engel was properly named as a defendant in the causes of action to quiet title and for return of personal property; Tony Engel was a proper defendant in the quiet title cause of action; and the Engels were not liable for attorney fees. The court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment and postjudgment order. View "Eleanor Licensing LLC v. Classic Recreations LLC" on Justia Law

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These consolidated appeals stemmed from a jury's finding that Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, and Clifford Harris, Jr.'s song "Blurred Lines," the world's bestselling single in 2013, infringed Frankie Christian Gaye, Nona Marvisa Gaye, and Marvin Gaye III's copyright in Marvin Gaye's 1977 hit song "Got To Give It Up." The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. The panel held that "Got To Give It Up" was entitled to broad copyright protection because musical compositions were not confined to a narrow range of expression; the panel accepted, without deciding, the merits of the district court's ruling that the scope of defendants' copyright was limited, under the Copyright Act of 1909, to the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office, and did not extend to sound recordings; the district court's order denying summary judgment was not reviewable after a full trial on the merits; the district court did not err in denying a new trial; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting portions of expert testimony; the verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence; the awards of actual damages and profits and the district court's running royalty were proper; the district court erred in overturning the jury's general verdict in favor of Harris and the Interscope Parties; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gayes' motion for attorney's fees; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning costs among the parties. View "Williams v. Gaye" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit appealed the district court's dismissal of Great Minds' copyright infringement action against FedEx. The court found that Great Minds' license did not explicitly address whether licensees may engage third parties to assist them in exercising their own noncommercial use rights under the license. The court held that, in view of the absence of any clear license language to the contrary, licensees may use third‐party agents such as commercial reproduction services in furtherance of their own permitted noncommercial uses. In this case, because FedEx acted as the mere agent of licensee school districts when it reproduced Great Minds' materials, and because there was no dispute that the school districts themselves sought to use Great Minds' materials for permissible purposes, FedEx's activities did not breach the license or violate Great Minds' copyright. View "Great Minds v. FedEx Office & Print Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for defendants and its order denying attorneys' fees in a copyright case alleging infringement of pornographic content. The panel held that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe harbor applied to defendants because the material at issue was stored at the direction of the users and defendants did not have actual or apparent knowledge that the clips were infringing. Furthermore, defendants expeditiously removed the infringing material once they received actual or red flag notice of the infringement, they did not receive financial benefit, and they had a policy to exclude repeat infringers. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a California state law claim, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorneys' fees to defendants. View "Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc." on Justia Law

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Where a foreign broadcaster uploads copyrighted content to its website and directs that content onto a computer screen in the United States at a user's request, the broadcaster commits an actionable domestic violation of the Copyright Act. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court's finding, based on supportable factual findings, that TV Polska was liable for infringing Spanski's copyrights in fifty-one episodes of certain Polish-language television programs that TV Polska transmitted into the United States via its online video-on-demand system, and concluded that damages of $60,000 per episode were appropriate in light of the circumstances. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to both liability and damages. View "Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a copyright infringement action brought by renowned photographer Jacobus Rentmeester against Nike. Rentmeester alleged that Nike infringed a famous photograph he took of Michael Jordan when Nike commissioned its own photograph of Jordan and then used that photo to create the "Jumpman" logo. The panel held that, although Rentmeester plausibly alleged that he owned a valid copyright in his photo and a presumption that the Nike photo was the product of copying rather than independent creation, he failed to plausibly allege that Nike copied enough of the protected expression from his photo to establish unlawful appropriation. The panel explained that Rentmeester was entitled to protection only for the way the pose was expressed in his photograph, a product of not just the pose but also the camera angle, timing, and shutter speed he chose. In this case, Rentmeester's photo was entitled to broad rather than thin protection. Nonetheless, the panel held that the works at issue were as a matter of law not substantially similar, and thus the Jumpman logo was even less similar to Rentmeester's photo than the Nike photo itself. View "Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law