Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

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In this case handled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff, Alexis Marquez, an attorney who represented herself, claimed that an Acting New York State Supreme Court Justice harassed her and subjected her to inappropriate behavior during her service as his court attorney. Marquez challenged two interlocutory rulings that dismissed the complaint as to one defendant and denied reconsideration. However, the district court dismissed the case as a penalty for Marquez's failure to comply with discovery orders, which Marquez did not challenge in this appeal.The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Marquez's challenge to the interlocutory orders as it was not an appeal from a final decision of the district court. The Court explained that the merger rule, which allows an interlocutory order to merge into the final judgment, does not apply when a district court enters a dismissal as a sanction. If Marquez successfully challenges the sanction dismissal, she would then have the opportunity to challenge the interlocutory orders as part of any appeal from a final judgment on the merits. In this situation, however, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Marquez v. Silver" on Justia Law

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The case arose from appellant Khamal Fooks' claim that his attorney misled him about the parole eligibility related to his plea agreement. Fooks had pleaded guilty to third-degree murder, conspiracy, and carrying an unlicensed gun in a Pennsylvania state court. He later alleged that his lawyer incorrectly assured him he would be eligible for parole after ten years, when in reality, he had to serve at least twenty. His allegations, if true, would demonstrate that his lawyer’s advice was ineffective.Both the state and the federal district courts dismissed his claims without providing an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Fooks then appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Circuit Court found that Fooks' allegations, if proven, would indeed establish ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby warranting habeas relief.The Circuit Court held that the district court erred in not affording Fooks an evidentiary hearing to substantiate his allegations. The court emphasized the importance of giving petitioners a fair chance to prove their allegations and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The court did not rule on Fooks' entitlement to relief, instead emphasizing the need for a fair opportunity to present evidence supporting his claims. View "Khamal Fooks v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

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Charles Robinson, the defendant, was convicted of first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Edward Figueroa. Following his conviction, Robinson appealed and also filed a motion for a new trial citing multiple errors by trial counsel. Despite his appeal and the motion for a new trial, the conviction was affirmed.Later, Robinson appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that he was not competent to stand trial due to mental health issues and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court upheld the ruling, stating that Robinson had not shown any evidence that his mental health issues had influenced the jury's conclusion or prevented an adequate defense.Robinson's contention that his counsel failed "reasonably to communicate with him" during and after a conversation in the lockup was also dismissed, as the court found no evidence of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that warranted a new trial.The court concluded that the defendant did not present a substantial issue meriting an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his request for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Robinson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals related to a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Over two decades later, the defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing that his trial counsel did not inform him of his right to testify and prevented him from testifying. He also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective because they filed an Anders brief.The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly disposed of the defendant's claims. The record demonstrated that the defendant was aware of his right to testify, and there was no evidence to support his claim that his trial counsel prevented him from testifying. Furthermore, the defendant's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge limitations on an expert witness’s testimony was without merit because the trial court had appropriately restricted the expert from using legal terminology. Therefore, the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel were deemed baseless.The Supreme Court also held that the standard of review set forth in a previous case, State v. Allen, which involved reviewing MARs in the light most favorable to defendants, was a departure from the court's longstanding standard of review. Thus, the court returned to the previous standard of review, which involves a statutory review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c). View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Marta Urias and her incapacitated husband, Manuel Urias, were represented by Daniel P. Buttafuoco and his law firm in a medical malpractice suit. The suit, against four defendants, resulted in a $3.7 million settlement. Buttafuoco calculated his legal fees separately for each defendant, as per his interpretation of Judiciary Law § 474-a. His fee totaled $864,552, which he later reduced to $710,000. Marta Urias later sued Buttafuoco, claiming that he deceived her and the court about the legal fees they were entitled to by offering a false interpretation of the law. Buttafuoco moved for summary judgment, arguing that Urias's sole remedy was to move under CPLR 5015 to vacate the underlying judgment. Both the Supreme Court and Appellate Division dismissed Urias's claims.The Court of Appeals held that Judiciary Law § 487 allows a plenary action for attorney deceit, even if the claim could undermine a separate final judgment. However, the Court also found that Buttafuoco was entitled to summary judgment on Urias's claim. It found no material issue of fact as to whether Buttafuoco made false statements regarding his fee calculations. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division order, holding that Urias had failed to establish a material, triable issue of fact as to whether Buttafuoco's interpretations of the fee calculations or litigation expenses amounted to false statements. Therefore, while Judiciary Law § 487 permits a plenary action, Buttafuoco was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. View "Urias v Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Assoc., PLLC" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of Georgia, Marquavious Howard was appealing his felony murder conviction for the 2017 shooting death of Jacorbin King. Howard was accused of participating in a robbery at King's apartment that resulted in King's death. Howard was indicted along with four others, and at trial, he was found not guilty of malice murder and firearm possession, but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.Howard appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence of a photo identification, and the trial court erred in excusing a juror for cause. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of Howard's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.The Court found that there was enough evidence to support the conviction, including testimonies from several witnesses and a confession Howard allegedly made to a jail bunkmate. As for the claim of ineffective counsel, the Court ruled that Howard didn't prove that a motion to suppress the photo identification would have been granted. Regarding the excused juror, the Court stated that Howard didn't have a right to a specific juror and didn't prove that the selected jury was biased or incompetent. View "HOWARD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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This case involved defendant Julie A. Corey who was convicted of first-degree murder on the grounds of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with the underlying felony of aggravated kidnapping. Following her conviction, Corey filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney's failure to call a cell phone expert to testify about her location on the night of the murder. She also requested that the court enter a required finding of not guilty. The trial judge, who was also the motion judge, denied Corey's motion for a new trial but vacated her conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Corey committed the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Corey’s argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that her trial counsel's decision not to call a cell phone expert was not ineffective and would not have likely influenced the jury's conclusions. Furthermore, the court agreed with the Commonwealth that there was sufficient evidence to find Corey guilty of felony-murder with a predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, the court reinstated that conviction. The court also declined to exercise its powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce Corey's conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Corey" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed a case where a city was sued for negligence due to its failure to disclose a juror's potential conflict of interest during a trial. The City of Picayune had originally sued Landry Lewis Germany Architects, alleging defects in an addition to the Picayune City Hall. A juror, Lorenzo Breland, was the son of a Picayune city councilman. The City's representative informed the City's counsel of this relationship, but took no further action. At the end of the trial, the court was informed of this relationship, leading to the dismissal of Breland and a mistrial. Landry Lewis then counter-sued the City for negligence due to its failure to disclose this familial relationship.The trial court found in favor of Landry Lewis, awarding them $210,000 in damages. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed this decision. The court held that the City of Picayune did not owe a duty of care in tort to Landry Lewis that was breached by its failure to inform the trial court of the potential juror's familial relationship. The court reasoned that trials and voir dire are adversarial processes, and that it is incumbent upon both sides to perform their due diligence in identifying potential conflicts of interest. The court further noted that there were other mechanisms, such as sanctions or bar complaints, to address any perceived misconduct. Therefore, the award of damages for negligence was reversed and rendered. View "City of Picayune v. Landry Lewis Germany Architects, P.A." on Justia Law

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In this case, Andre Pugh appealed his conviction for the murder of his wife and the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pugh challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant for his cell phone records. He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search warrant's specificity and that his counsel during his motion for a new trial was ineffective in various respects.The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with Pugh's claims and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the search warrant in question was supported by probable cause. The warrant was based on Pugh's unusual behavior at the crime scene, his relationship with the victim, inconsistencies between his statements and the evidence at the scene, and evidence suggesting that the crime was committed by someone familiar with the residence.The court also rejected Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. It found that the claims Pugh wanted his trial counsel to raise would not have been successful. Additionally, it determined that Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his motion for a new trial were procedurally barred. View "PUGH v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Kentucky has removed Joseph “JS” Flynn from his position as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk following allegations of inappropriate workplace behavior. Flynn was appointed in 2016 and elected in 2018. In March 2022, a complaint was lodged against Flynn by a former employee, alleging several incidents of inappropriate behavior. Flynn admitted to having a brief sexual relationship with the complainant, his subordinate, in 2021, which he did not report, and to physically poking and verbally abusing his employees.Other allegations against Flynn included pulling the complainant into a car back seat, forcefully kissing her, and exposing himself. Flynn denied these allegations, claiming physical impossibility due to two surgically inserted rods in his back. Furthermore, the complainant alleged that Flynn would regularly touch her inappropriately and put his hand up her dress. Another employee corroborated many of these allegations.Based on the evidence provided during a three-day hearing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that Flynn had created a hostile work environment and engaged in quid pro quo harassment. The Court noted that Flynn failed to perform his duties with courtesy and respect, thereby tarnishing the judiciary's reputation. As a result, Flynn was removed from his position, and the Office of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk was declared vacant. Flynn was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. View "IN RE: FLYNN, PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT CLERK" on Justia Law