Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the death of a patient, Cindy Essex, who visited Samaritan Hospital's emergency room due to severe shoulder pain. The doctors, who were not employees of the hospital but independent contractors, failed to diagnose her necrotizing fasciitis, a severe soft-tissue infection, leading to her death within 24 hours. The estate of Cindy Essex sought to hold Samaritan Hospital liable for the doctors' alleged negligence under theories of nondelegable duty, inherent function, and agency law principles of delegation.The trial court denied the estate's motion for partial summary judgment concerning Samaritan’s potential vicarious liability for the doctors' alleged negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that ostensible agency is the sole basis for holding a hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of nonemployee physicians.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that statutes and regulations impose nondelegable duties on hospitals concerning the provision of emergency services. A hospital remains responsible for those nondelegable duties regardless of whether it performs those duties through its own staff or contracts with doctors who are independent contractors. The court also found that the estate provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment concerning its corporate negligence claim against Samaritan. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Essex v. Grant County Public Hospital District No. 1" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a premises liability claim filed by Diane Lands against Sunset Manor, LP, and Bingham County Senior Citizens Center, Inc. Lands tripped on an uneven sidewalk outside her apartment building, Sunset Manor, and suffered injuries including a concussion, headaches, chin pain, dizziness, and short-term memory loss. She claimed that her injuries were a result of the fall and sought damages for past and future medical expenses, non-economic damages, and other losses.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho had previously reviewed the case. The court issued a scheduling order setting deadlines for disclosing expert witnesses and completing discovery. Lands failed to meet these deadlines, leading to the exclusion of her expert witnesses at trial. The district court also limited the time period for which non-economic damages could be recovered due to the lack of expert testimony.In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, Lands argued that her disclosure deadlines were automatically extended when the trial and pretrial conference were postponed. She also contended that the district court erroneously required non-retained experts to be disclosed at the same time and in the same manner as retained experts. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the district court, ruling that Lands' disclosure deadlines were not extended and that any error in the district court's interpretation of the disclosure requirement for non-retained witnesses was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not err in limiting Lands' non-economic damages. View "Lands v. Sunset Manor, LP" on Justia Law

The case involves three consolidated appeals by Dexcom, Inc., a California-based company, against the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to remand three product liability actions back to California state court. The remand was based on the forum defendant rule, which prohibits removal based on diversity jurisdiction if any of the defendants is a citizen of the state where the action is brought.Dexcom had removed the cases to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction after the complaints were submitted electronically but before they were officially filed by the clerk of court. Dexcom argued that the forum defendant rule did not bar removal because it had not yet been “joined and served” as a defendant.The district court held that an electronically submitted complaint is not “filed” in California state court until it is processed and endorsed or otherwise acknowledged as officially filed by the clerk of the court. Therefore, Dexcom’s removals were ineffectual attempts to remove cases that did not yet exist as civil actions pending in state court. As a result, the district court had the power to grant the plaintiffs’ eventual motions to remand based on a perceived violation of the forum defendant rule, even though the motions were brought 31 days after Dexcom’s initial (ineffectual) notices of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, as the district court had the power under § 1447(c) to order remand based on the forum defendant rule. View "Casola v. Dexcom, Inc." on Justia Law

On July 4, 2022, a mass shooting occurred in Highland Park, Illinois, where Robert Eugene Crimo III used a Smith & Wesson M&P15 rifle to kill seven people and wound 48 others. Victims of the shooting and their estates filed multiple consolidated suits against Crimo, his father, the gun shops where Crimo acquired the rifle, and the rifle's manufacturer, Smith & Wesson. The plaintiffs argued that Smith & Wesson should not have offered the M&P15 to civilians, as it is a machine gun reserved for police and military use. They also claimed that the manufacturer is liable because the weapon was advertised in a way that attracted irresponsible individuals.The defendants, including Smith & Wesson, filed notices of removal to federal court, asserting that the victims' claims arise under federal law. However, the two Crimos, who are the principal asserted wrongdoers, neither filed their own notices of removal nor consented to Smith & Wesson’s. This led the plaintiffs to move for remand, arguing that all defendants must consent to removal under federal law. Smith & Wesson countered that removal was authorized by a statute that allows removal whether or not other defendants elect to be in federal court.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was not persuaded by Smith & Wesson's arguments and remanded the cases to state court. Smith & Wesson appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the cases to state court. The court rejected Smith & Wesson's argument that the state suits presented multiple "claims" against them, stating that the company's belief that each legal theory is a separate "claim" is incorrect. The court clarified that the core claim in these suits is that Crimo killed and injured multiple persons, and Smith & Wesson may bear secondary liability for their role in facilitating his acts. The court also suggested that the district judge should consider whether Smith & Wesson must reimburse the plaintiffs' costs and fees occasioned by the unjustified removal and appeal. View "Roberts v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a slip and fall incident at a Trader Joe's grocery store in Nashville, Tennessee. The plaintiff, Melissa Binns, alleged that she slipped and fell due to the negligence of an employee who was stocking shelves in a disorganized manner, causing a package of tofu to fall and spill liquid on the floor. Binns filed a complaint against Trader Joe's East, Inc., alleging premises liability, negligent training, and negligent supervision. Trader Joe's sought to dismiss the negligent training and supervision claims, arguing that these claims should be dismissed when asserted concurrently with a premises liability claim and that the plaintiff's direct negligence claims were no longer viable due to the defendant admitting it was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee.The trial court rejected both of Trader Joe's arguments and denied its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. The court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal, which was denied by the Court of Appeals. Trader Joe's then appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which granted review.The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the preemption rule, which would dismiss direct negligence claims when a defendant admits vicarious liability, is incompatible with Tennessee's system of comparative fault and declined to adopt it. The court also declined to adopt the rule proposed by Trader Joe's that "negligent activity" claims cannot be asserted alongside premises liability claims. As a result, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying Trader Joe's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Binns v. Trader Joe's East, Inc." on Justia Law

In November 2015, Mark Kinslow hit Daniala Mohammadi with his car while she was riding her bicycle. Mohammadi, who was a minor at the time of the accident, sued Kinslow in December 2019, more than two years but less than three years after she turned eighteen. Kinslow moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired two years after Mohammadi’s eighteenth birthday. Mohammadi countered that the usual three-year statute of limitations for motor vehicle accidents had not started to run until her eighteenth birthday.The trial court granted Kinslow’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Mohammadi was required to bring her claim either within three years of the incident, or within two years after she turned eighteen. The court of appeals reversed this decision, agreeing with Mohammadi and concluding that it was bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of Colorado providing that statutes of limitations are “tolled” for claims by a minor plaintiff until the minor turns eighteen.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the court of appeals' decision. The court concluded that the plain language of section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. (2023), gives a plaintiff who turns eighteen within the three-year limitation period for a motor vehicle accident a statute of limitations that is the longer of (1) the full three years normally accorded an accident victim, or (2) two years from their eighteenth birthday. For Mohammadi, this meant that she was required to bring her claim by January 1, 2019—two years after she turned eighteen. Because her suit was filed after that date, it was untimely. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Kinslow v. Mohammadi" on Justia Law

Maryam Mohammadi, an employee at a Wells Fargo branch located inside a Randalls grocery store, slipped and fell next to a shopping cart that contained leaking items. Mohammadi sued Randalls, alleging that the store failed to warn her about the puddle that formed next to the cart. The jury ruled in favor of Randalls, finding that the store was not liable under a constructive-knowledge standard of premises liability, which asked whether Randalls should have reasonably known about the danger. The jury was instructed not to consider Randalls's liability under an actual-knowledge standard based on their answer to the constructive-knowledge question.The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed the jury's decision, arguing that the jury should have been allowed to consider liability under the actual-knowledge standard, even after finding no liability under the constructive-knowledge standard. The court of appeals held that Randalls could be charged with actual knowledge of the danger even without actual knowledge of the wet floor, because its employees knew a leaking product placed in a shopping cart would drip onto the floor.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation. The court found that any error in the jury instructions would have been harmless because there was no evidence that Randalls had actual knowledge of the wet floor. The court clarified that the relevant danger was the wet floor, not the antecedent situation that produced it. The court concluded that since there was no evidence of actual knowledge of the danger, no reasonable jury could have answered the actual-knowledge question in Mohammadi’s favor. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Albertsons, LLC v. Mohammadi" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Susan Miller, who sued Michaels Stores, Inc. for negligence after she slipped and fell in one of their stores in Slidell, Louisiana, during a rainstorm. Miller claimed that she had entered the store via a propped-open exit door, where no warning signs or mats were present, and subsequently slipped on a clear substance. She argued that a store employee had admitted to the presence of a warning sign and mat at the other door, indicating that the store was aware of the wet conditions but had failed to adequately warn customers.Earlier, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana had granted summary judgment in favor of Michaels. The store had argued that Miller lacked evidence proving that they had notice of any hazards where she slipped. The district court ruled that none of the evidence showed that Michaels was aware of a hazard in the area where Miller fell, and hence granted summary judgement for Michaels.Upon review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Miller's evidence was insufficient to show that Michaels had actual or constructive notice of the specific hazard that caused her fall. Furthermore, it ruled that the statements made by the Michaels employee were irrelevant to the issue of notice and were therefore inadmissible. Lastly, the court found no evidence that Michaels had spoiled any evidence, as alleged by Miller. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Michaels Stores. View "Miller v. Michaels Stores" on Justia Law

Patricia Hanger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Allison L. Raines and Emergency Physicians of Tidewater, PLC, alleging that they negligently failed to treat her low blood sodium, leading to a seizure and a subsequent fall that resulted in a traumatic brain injury. The defendants argued that the fall could have been caused by other means. A jury sided with Hanger and awarded her $1.6 million, a decision that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals had to decide whether the trial court erred in refusing a jury instruction supporting the defendants' theory of the case. The Court of Appeals held that this question was waived. The defendants argued that they did not waive their right to appeal this question and that they were entitled to the issuance of their proffered jury instruction.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, concluding that the defendants did not waive their argument. The Supreme Court found that the defendants had preserved their objection to the trial court's refusal to issue the jury instruction and had adequately briefed the matter before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's failure to issue the jury instruction was reversible error and that the Court of Appeals also erred in declining to rule on the matter. The case was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to enter a mandate to the trial court consistent with the opinion. View "Emergency Physicians of Tidewater v. Hanger" on Justia Law

In March 2017, Monique Howard, the plaintiff, stayed at a hotel operated by the defendant, Accor Management US, Inc. During her stay, the handheld shower head in her room fell apart, cutting her and causing her to fall. Howard subsequently sued the hotel for negligence and premises liability. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish that the hotel had actual or constructive notice of any problem with the handheld shower head. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding the hotel's notice of the shower head's unsafe condition.On appeal to the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight, the plaintiff argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because her evidence raised triable issues regarding the hotel's knowledge of the unsafe shower wand. She also argued that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to raise a triable issue on notice. The court also rejected the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Regarding the plaintiff's reliance on an expert's declaration, the court sustained most of the defendant's evidentiary objections, finding the expert's conclusions speculative and lacking foundation. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to the hotel’s notice of a flaw in the shower wand, thus affirming the trial court's decision. View "Howard v. Accor Management US" on Justia Law