Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

The case involves the allocation of statutory royalties collected from cable television systems for the distant retransmission of broadcast programming between 2014 and 2017. Under Section 111 of the Copyright Act, cable providers pay fees into a pooled fund, which the Copyright Royalty Board (the Board) is tasked with distributing among copyright claimants based on the relative marketplace value of their programming. Six claimant groups participated, including the Joint Sports Claimants (JSC) and Public Television (PTV), both of whom challenged the Board’s methodology and the resulting allocation.The Copyright Royalty Board conducted adversarial proceedings, admitting evidence and expert testimony focused on two principal valuation methods: regression analysis and constant-sum surveys (specifically the Bortz Survey). After accounting for adjustments to correct for market changes and methodological limitations—such as the conversion of WGNA from broadcast to cable and the impact of must-carry rules—the Board issued a final determination in June 2024, allocating royalty shares among the groups. Both JSC and PTV appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, while other claimant groups intervened.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court rejected nearly all challenges to the Board’s use of regression and survey methodologies, finding them reasonable. However, the court found the Board failed to sufficiently explain how it merged the results of the two methodologies to arrive at the final allocation percentages. Because the decisive step in the allocation process lacked a clear and reasoned explanation, the court vacated the Board’s final determination and remanded for further proceedings and clarification. View "Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. LOC" on Justia Law

Manufacturers of medical and digital devices, represented by two trade associations, challenged a regulation enacted by the Librarian of Congress under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The regulation, known as the medical device repair exemption, allows certain third parties to circumvent technological protection measures on medical equipment software for the purpose of diagnosis, maintenance, or repair. The associations contended that this exemption threatened their copyrights by enabling independent service organizations to access and use software that, they argued, was primarily intended for repair and maintenance.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed some of the associations’ claims, including those under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), on sovereign immunity grounds and found the rulemaking was within the Librarian’s authority and not unconstitutional. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in part, directing the district court to evaluate the APA claims. After further rulemaking and additional arguments, including discussion of Supreme Court precedent and the renewal of the exemption, the district court granted summary judgment for the Librarian and Library of Congress. The court concluded that the exemption was consistent with the DMCA, the fair use doctrine, and was supported by the administrative record.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the Librarian’s adoption and renewal of the medical device repair exemption were not arbitrary or capricious under the APA. The court found the Librarian’s application of the statutory fair use factors reasonable, including determinations that the use was transformative, the software was primarily functional, the amount of use was justified, and the exemption did not harm the market for the original works. The judgment for the Librarian and Library of Congress was affirmed. View "Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

Music Choice, a company that transmits copyrighted sound recordings to businesses for background music, was accused by SoundExchange, Inc. of underpaying required royalties. The dispute centered on the proper interpretation of a federal regulation defining “gross proceeds,” which dictates the revenue base on which Music Choice must pay royalties for its business services. SoundExchange believed all revenues from business transmissions should be included, while Music Choice argued that only revenues derived solely from business services should count, excluding those also attributable to subscription services.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, stayed the ongoing litigation and allowed the parties to seek an interpretive ruling from the Copyright Royalty Board (the “Royalty Board”). The Royalty Board, after reopening the relevant regulatory dockets, issued a ruling adopting SoundExchange’s interpretation of the regulation. Rather than returning to district court, Music Choice directly petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review and vacatur of the Royalty Board’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Royalty Board’s interpretive ruling. The court reasoned that such a ruling was not a judicially reviewable “determination” under 17 U.S.C. § 803(c) and did not result from a proceeding in which Music Choice was a participant as required by statute. Additionally, the court found that the ruling did not bind Music Choice or any other party. As a result, the court dismissed Music Choice’s petition for review, leaving the parties to pursue their dispute in the district court. View "Music Choice v. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD" on Justia Law

A computer scientist, Dr. Stephen Thaler, created an artificial intelligence system called the "Creativity Machine," which autonomously generated an artwork titled "A Recent Entrance to Paradise." Dr. Thaler submitted a copyright registration application to the United States Copyright Office, listing the Creativity Machine as the sole author and himself as the owner. The Copyright Office denied the application, citing its policy that only works authored by humans are eligible for copyright protection.Dr. Thaler sought review of the Copyright Office's decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court affirmed the Copyright Office's denial, holding that human authorship is a fundamental requirement under the Copyright Act of 1976. The court also rejected Dr. Thaler's argument that he should own the copyright under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, as the work was never eligible for copyright protection in the first place. Additionally, the court found that Dr. Thaler had waived his argument that he should be considered the author because he created and used the Creativity Machine.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Copyright Act requires all eligible works to be authored by a human being. Since Dr. Thaler listed the Creativity Machine, a non-human entity, as the sole author, the application was correctly denied. The court did not address the argument that the Constitution requires human authorship, nor did it consider Dr. Thaler's claim that he is the author by virtue of creating and using the Creativity Machine, as this argument was waived before the agency. View "Thaler v. Perlmutter" on Justia Law

SoundExchange, a nonprofit entity, charged with the responsibility of collecting royalties for performing artists and copyright owners of music, filed suit under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., against Muzak, a company that supplies digital music channels to satellite television networks who, in turn, sell to subscribers. SoundExchange alleged that Muzak underpaid royalties owed. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that the better interpretation of the statute is that the term "service" under section 114(j)(11) contemplates a double limitation; both the business and the program offering must qualify before the transmissions are eligible for the favorable rate. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court. View "SoundExchange, Inc. v. Muzak LLC" on Justia Law