Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Apprio, Inc., a government contractor, and its former employee, Neil Zaccari. Zaccari, a Senior Technical Manager at Apprio, had developed a regulatory compliance software prior to his employment. During his tenure, he updated the software, demonstrated it at work, and handed it over to Apprio upon request. Apprio then sent Zaccari a document titled “Proprietary Information and Assignment of Inventions Agreement,” which Zaccari acknowledged through Apprio’s human resources portal. After his termination, Zaccari copyrighted the updated software and sued Apprio for breaching the agreement when it allegedly forced him to turn over a copy of the software to an Apprio client. In response, Apprio countersued Zaccari for breaching the agreement when he refused to assign his rights in the updated software to Apprio.The District Court combined the cases, dismissed Zaccari’s case for failure to state a claim, and granted partial and full summary judgment for Apprio with respect to contractual assignment of rights in the updated software and its breach of contract claim. Zaccari appealed, arguing that the agreement is not an enforceable contract and, alternatively, that the agreement neither supports the assignment of his rights in the updated software to Apprio nor a finding that he breached the agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with Zaccari's arguments. The court held that Zaccari’s “acknowledgment” of the agreement created an enforceable contract that requires Zaccari to assign his rights in the updated software to Apprio. Accordingly, Zaccari breached the binding agreement by failing to assign those rights to Apprio and disclosing the updated software’s underlying code to the U.S. Copyright Office in order to obtain the copyright. The court affirmed the District Court's decision. View "Apprio, Inc. v. Zaccari" on Justia Law

The case involves the Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance and the Advanced Medical Technology Association, two trade associations representing medical device manufacturers, who sued the Library of Congress and the Librarian of Congress. The dispute arose from an exemption to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that allowed some access to the software of advanced medical devices. The trade associations claimed that the exemption violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the APA claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the Library of Congress is part of “the Congress” and therefore not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA’s judicial review provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court held that irrespective of whether the Library is an “agency,” Congress has specified that copyright regulations under Title 17 of the U.S. Code are subject to the APA. The court concluded that DMCA rules are subject to the APA just like other copyright rules, and therefore, the APA provides the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity for this suit. The court remanded the case back to the district court to assess the APA claims. View "Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are three standard-developing organizations: the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and the NFPA. Defendant, Public.Resource.Org, is a non-profit group that disseminates legal and other materials. It has posted on its website copies of hundreds of incorporated standards. Plaintiffs sued Public Resource for copyright infringement. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their claims as to nine of the disputed standards. The district court granted the motion and enjoined Public Resource from posting these standards. The DC Circuit reversed and remanded for further factual development. On remand, the district court held that the non-commercial posting of standards incorporated by reference into law is fair use.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s reasonable exercise of discretion in declining to award injunctive relief. The court explained that the first three factors under section 107 strongly favor fair use, and the fourth is equivocal. The court concluded that Public Resource’s non-commercial posting of incorporated standards is fair use. Further, the court found that the district court reasonably declined to enter an injunction. Public Resource promptly removed from its website the 32 standards found not to have been incorporated into law. The court explained that Plaintiffs give the court no reason to think that Public Resource will post unincorporated standards again absent an injunction View "American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc." on Justia Law

The Copyright Office sent a letter to Valancourt Books, LLC, an independent press based in Richmond, Virginia, demanding physical copies of Valancourt’s published books on the pain of fines. Valancourt protested that it could not afford to deposit physical copies and that much of what it published was in the public domain. In response, the Office narrowed the list of demanded works but continued to demand that Valancourt deposit copies of its books with the Library of Congress or otherwise face a fine. Valancourt then brought this action against the Register of Copyrights and the Attorney General. Valancourt challenged the application of Section 407’s deposit requirement against it as an unconstitutional taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment and an invalid burden on its speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on both claims.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the government’s favor and remanded for the entry of judgment to Valancourt and the award of relief. The court concluded that Section 407, as applied by the Copyright Office in this case, worked an unconstitutional taking of Valancourt’s property. The court explained that the Office demanded that Valancourt relinquish property (physical copies of copyrighted books) on the pain of fines. And because the requirement to turn over copies of the works is not a condition of attaining (or retaining) copyright protection in them, the demand to forfeit property cannot be justified as the conferral of a benefit in exchange for property. View "Valancourt Books, LLC v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Every five years, the Copyright Royalty Board (the “Board”) issues a statutory license that establishes the terms and rates under which certain entities that stream copyrighted songs over the internet make royalty payments to the songs’ copyright owners. The “webcasters” that are subject to the license are “noninteractive” — i.e., they stream music without letting their listeners choose songs on demand. This appeal challenges on various grounds the Board’s most recent noninteractive webcaster license Final Determination, covering calendar years 2021 through 2025.   The DC Circuit sustained Board’s Final Determination in all respects. The court held that the Board’s decision to set a royalty rate that was slightly below the Willig model’s flawed opportunity-cost measure is neither here nor there. And thus, the court explained, it has no occasion to decide, as SoundExchange urges, whether it would, as a matter of law, violate the willing buyer/willing seller standard for the Board to set a royalty rate below some definitive measure of opportunity cost. View "National Religious Broadcasters Noncommercial Music License Committee v. CRB" on Justia Law

Claiming that the code they write qualifies as speech protected by the First Amendment, Appellants brought a pre-enforcement action challenging the DMCA on facial and as-applied First Amendment grounds. The government moved to dismiss all claims, and the district court partially granted the motion. The district court dismissed all, but the as-applied First Amendment claims. The district court summarily denied an injunction for the dismissed claims. Appellants appealed the district court’s dismissal of their facial challenge and denial of injunctive relief.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court first addressed jurisdiction and held that declaring the DMCA facially unconstitutional would resolve Appellants’ as-applied claims, but not so in reverse, ensuring that their as-applied claims remain anything but inextricably bound to their facial challenge. The court, therefore, held that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellants’ facial challenge.   In regards to the Appellant, that wants to publish an academic book “to instruct readers in the methods of security research,” which will include “examples of code capable of bypassing security measures, the court held that the government’s concession ends any “credible threat of prosecution” against Appellant, leaving him without standing to obtain a preliminary injunction. Moreover, the court held that the other Appellant’s arguments on the remaining preliminary injunction factors rest entirely on his flawed claim that continued enforcement of the DMCA imperils his First Amendment rights. View "Matthew Green v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a lower grandfathered royalty rate is paid by some music services that were early providers of digital music transmissions. Music Choice, a digital broadcast music service that consists of several cable television channels, challenges the Board's final determination, which excludes Music Choice's internet transmissions from the grandfathered rate and also adopts more stringent audit requirements.The DC Circuit held that the Board's categorical exclusion of Music Choice's internet transmissions from the grandfathered rate conflicts with the unambiguous language of the DMCA. The court explained that, pursuant to the DMCA, Music Choice's internet transmissions are eligible for the grandfathered rate to the extent they were part of its service offering on July 31, 1998. However, the Board retains discretion to determine whether parts of Music Choice's current service offering, which includes mobile applications and internet-exclusive channels, should be excluded from the grandfathered rate. The court also held that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in altering the audit standards applicable to Music Choice. Therefore, the court vacated the relevant parts of the final determination, remanding for the Board to determine whether Music Choice's internet transmissions qualified for the grandfathered rate and to reconsider the amended audit procedure. View "Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Board" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, appellants challenge the royalty rates and terms established by the Board for the period of January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2022. Appellants challenged numerous aspects of the Board's final determination: the Streaming Services argue that the Board's decision impermissibly applies retroactively; the Streaming Services challenge the Board's rate structure and the specific rates applicable under that structure; the Streaming Services and the Copyright Owners each object to the Board's definition of certain terms; and songwriter George Johnson challenges the Board's acceptance of the Subpart A settlement, as well as its adoption of the final rate structure.The DC Circuit rejected the Streaming Services' retroactivity objection and the challenges brought by the Copyright Owners and George Johnson. However, the court agreed with the Streaming Services that the Board failed to provide adequate notice of the final rate structure, failed to reasonably explain its rejection of the Phonorecords II settlement as a benchmark, and failed to identify under what authority it substantively redefined a term after publishing its initial determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded to the Board in part because it failed to give adequate notice or to sufficiently explain critical aspects of its decisionmaking. View "Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Board" on Justia Law

IPG, an agent for royalty claimants in these proceedings, filed suit challenging Copyright Royalty Judges' denial of most of its clients' royalty fee claims for programming in the devotional and program suppliers' categories that was retransmitted by cable during specific years. IPG lost the right to pursue many of its clients' claims as a result of a discovery sanction and ultimately failed to establish for certain claims that it was a duly appointed agent pressing valid claims.The DC Circuit affirmed the Judges' decisions as to IPG's challenge to the revocation of the presumption of validity where the Judges did not abuse their discretion in withholding the presumption based on false testimony and where IPG received constitutionally adequate due process; affirmed as to IPG's challenge to the imposition of discovery sanctions where the sanction, while harsh, was not arbitrary and capricious and did not violate due process; and affirmed as to IPG's challenge to the final distribution of royalties where the Judges' distribution methodology decisions were well within a zone of reasonableness. View "Independent Producers Group v. Copyright Royalty Board" on Justia Law

IMAPizza, which operates the "&pizza" chain of restaurants in the United States, filed suit under the Copyright and Lanham Acts as well as D.C. common law against At Pizza, operator of the "@pizza" restaurant in Edinburgh, Scotland.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of IMAPizza's Copyright and Lanham Act claims, holding that IMAPizza failed to state a claim under the Copyright Act because it did not allege an act of copyright infringement in the United States. The court declined to extend the Copyright Act beyond its territorial limits lest U.S. law be used to sanction what might be lawful conduct in another country. The court also held that IMAPizza failed to state a claim under the Lanham Act because it failed to allege some plausible effect — let alone a significant or substantial effect — upon U.S. commerce. Finally, the court held that IMAPizza's trespass claim fails for want of any unauthorized entry into its restaurants, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying IMAPizza's motions for leave to file a surreply and to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the U.K.'s "passing off" claim. View "Imapizza, LLC v. At Pizza Limited" on Justia Law