Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Ed Sheeran and Amy Wadge wrote the song "Thinking Out Loud," which became a global hit. Structured Asset Sales, LLC (SAS), which owns a portion of the royalties for Marvin Gaye's 1973 song "Let’s Get It On," alleged that Sheeran's song infringed on the copyright of Gaye's song. SAS claimed that the chord progression and syncopated harmonic rhythm in "Thinking Out Loud" were copied from "Let’s Get It On."The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York initially denied Sheeran's motion for summary judgment but later granted it upon reconsideration. The court concluded that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm in "Let’s Get It On" was too commonplace to warrant copyright protection. The court also excluded evidence and expert testimony related to musical elements not present in the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office in 1973, which defined the scope of the copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the scope of the copyright was limited to the elements in the deposited sheet music and that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm was not original enough to be protectable. The court also found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs substantially similar as a whole, given their different melodies and lyrics. Thus, the court held that Sheeran did not infringe on the copyright of "Let’s Get It On" and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Sheeran. View "Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran" on Justia Law

The case involves Internet Archive (IA), a nonprofit organization that creates digital copies of print books and makes them available online for free through its "Free Digital Library." IA maintains a one-to-one owned-to-loaned ratio, meaning it only allows as many digital checkouts as it has physical copies. In 2020, four major book publishers sued IA, alleging that its practices infringed their copyrights on 127 books. IA claimed its actions were protected under the fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the publishers, rejecting IA's fair use defense. The court found that IA's use of the books was non-transformative, commercial in nature, and that it usurped the market for the publishers' eBooks, causing market harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that IA's use of the books was not transformative because it did not add new expression, meaning, or message to the original works. Instead, it served the same purpose as the originals, making them available to read. The court also found that IA's use was commercial, as it solicited donations and had a partnership with Better World Books, which provided some financial benefit. The court concluded that IA's practices harmed the publishers' market for eBooks and print books, as IA's free digital copies served as a substitute for the originals.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that IA's Free Digital Library did not qualify as fair use under the Copyright Act. The court emphasized that allowing such widespread copying and distribution without compensation would undermine the incentives for authors to create new works. View "Hachette Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive" on Justia Law

Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. (MGP) sued Ruthie Allyn Davis and associated entities for copyright infringement, alleging that Davis used Michael Grecco’s copyrighted photos without a license. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed MGP’s complaint, reasoning that MGP, being a sophisticated plaintiff in detecting and litigating infringements, should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. The district court concluded that MGP’s claims were time-barred by the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations provision.The district court’s decision was based on the premise that sophisticated plaintiffs cannot benefit from the discovery rule, which determines when a claim accrues. The court held that MGP’s sophistication in detecting infringements meant it should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, offering MGP the opportunity to amend the complaint to allege a separately occurring act of infringement within the limitations period, which MGP declined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s application of the discovery rule. The appellate court held that the discovery rule, not the injury rule, determines when a copyright infringement claim accrues, regardless of the plaintiff’s sophistication. The court emphasized that there is no “sophisticated plaintiff” exception to the discovery rule or to a defendant’s burden to plead and prove a statute-of-limitations defense. The appellate court found that it was not clear from the face of the complaint that MGP’s claims were time-barred and vacated the district court’s dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. RADesign, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he co-created the song “All the Way Up,” but that he has not been properly credited or compensated for his contribution. He filed this action in the district court asserting claims under the Copyright Act, as well as various tort claims. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff assigned away any rights he may have had in the song, but the agreement has never been produced, and the parties disagree about its content and effect. The district court admitted a draft version of the missing agreement as a duplicate, and then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without allowing Plaintiff to conduct discovery.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the draft admissible as a duplicate original under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, but properly admitted the draft as “other evidence of the content” of the original under Rule 1004. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment and erred in concluding that no genuine dispute of material fact existed based on the current record. View "Elliott v. Cartagena, et al." on Justia Law

A collection of music publishers alleged infringement of their copyrights in 197 musical works when a series of live concert recordings was made available by Defendants for download and streaming on their websites. Plaintiffs sought damages and a permanent injunction pursuant to the Copyright Act. The district court held on summary judgment that Defendants had no valid licenses and therefore infringed each of the musical works and that the principal was personally liable. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction.   Defendants appealed from the district court’s summary judgment order and the order granting fees and costs. Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the district court’s denial of a permanent injunction, several evidentiary rulings, and the denial of a new trial.   The Second Circuit affirmed the rulings in the summary judgment order to the extent they: (a) held that Defendants failed to obtain a license for any of the audiovisual recordings, and therefore infringed the audiovisual works; (b) concluded that Defendants had no valid affirmative defense, and (c) declined the Publishers’ request for a permanent injunction. The court vacated the ruling in the summary judgment order that Defendants infringed the musical works used in the audio-only recordings by failing to comply with Section 115’s substantive requirements. The court reversed the ruling on summary judgment that Defendant was liable for direct infringement. The court rejected the challenges to evidentiary rulings. The court affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial. Finally, the court vacated the award of attorneys’ fees. View "ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Sagan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s judgment granting Defendant Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (“Sirius XM”)’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice for violations of his right of publicity under California common and statutory law because his claims were preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Section 301. The claims arise from Melendez’s performance under the moniker “Stuttering John” on The Howard Stern Show (the “HS Show”) from 1988 until 2004.   On appeal, Plaintiff asserted that Sirius XM’s use of excerpts of him from the archival episodes in its online and on-air advertisements promoting the HS Show violates his right of publicity under California common and statutory law because his name and likeness have been exploited for Sirius XM’s commercial gain without his permission.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege any use of his name or likeness that is separate from, or beyond, the rebroadcasting, in whole or in part, of the copyrightable material from the HS Show’s archives and, thus, his right of publicity claims are preempted by the Copyright Act. Moreover, because Plaintiff has failed to articulate any allegations that he could add in a second amended complaint that overcome preemption in this case, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that any leave to re-plead would be futile and properly dismissed his claims with prejudice. View "Melendez v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, heirs to the late songwriter and record producer Hugo Peretti, appealed from the district court’s order dismissing Appellants’ action, which sought a declaratory judgment that Appellants had validly terminated a 1983 grant of rights in the copyright to the hit song “Can’t Help Falling in Love.” The district court dismissed the action, holding that the grant was not “executed by the author” under Section 203 of the Copyright Act of 1976 and therefore that Appellants had no statutory right to terminate the grant.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that Section 203 of the Copyright Act of 1976 applies only to grants executed by the author. While Hugo Peretti’s signature is affixed to the grant document at issue, the interests at issue are the contingent rights held and transferred to the Appellees’ predecessors-in-interest by Peretti’s spouse and children, the grant of which was not and cannot be executed by the author.  The court reasoned that while Hugo Peretti’s signature is on the 1983 Assignment, he cannot have executed a grant transferring rights, such as those owned by his family members, that he did not hold. Rather, his signature on the grant document transfers only his own contingent right to the renewal term, while his wife’s and daughters’ signatures transferred their respective contingent rights. Thus, because Hugo Peretti died before his contingent right vested, the rights transferred to Appellee’s predecessors-in-interest were the contingent rights held by his wife and daughter. View "Peretti v. Authentic Brands Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that, for Copyright Act purposes, the screenwriter Victor Miller was an independent contractor of the film production company Manny, Inc., in 1979, when Miller wrote the screenplay for the landmark horror film Friday the 13th, released in 1980. Manny argues primarily that Miller's membership in the Writers' Guild of America, East, Inc. (WGA), and Manny's participation in the producers' collective bargaining agreement with the WGA in the same period establish that Miller was Manny's employee for Copyright Act purposes.The court concluded that copyright law, not labor law, controls the "work for hire" determination here. The court explained that because the definition of "employee" under copyright law is grounded in the common law of agency and the Reid framework and serves different purposes than do the labor law concepts regarding employment relationships, there is no sound basis for using labor law to override copyright law goals. Furthermore, there was no error in the district court's refusal to treat Miller's WGA membership as a separate Reid factor. The court applied the Reid factors and concluded that Miller was an independent contractor when he wrote the screenplay and is therefore entitled to authorship rights. The court also concluded that the notice of termination that Miller gave under section 203 of the Copyright Act is effective as to Manny and its successors. The court found that the Companies' remaining arguments did not provide a basis for reversal and thus affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Miller. View "Horror Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Foundation on its complaint for a declaratory judgment of fair use and the district court's dismissal of defendant's counterclaim for copyright infringement. This case involves visual art works by Andy Warhol based on a 1981 photograph of the musical artist Prince that was taken by defendant, Lynn Goldsmith, in her studio, and in which she holds copyright.The court concluded that the district court erred in its assessment and application of the fair-use factors and that the works in question do not qualify as fair use as a matter of law. In this case, the court considered each of the four factors and found that each favors defendant. Furthermore, although the factors are not exclusive, the Foundation has not identified any additional relevant considerations unique to this case that the court should take into account. The court likewise concluded that the Prince Series works are substantially similar to the Goldsmith Photograph as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Curtis James Jackson III, the hip-hop recording artist known as 50 Cent, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendant William Leonard Roberts II, the hip-hop recording artist known as Rick Ross, on the grounds that Jackson's claim of violation of the Connecticut common law right of publicity is preempted by the Copyright Act. The complaint alleged that, on the mixtape entitled Renzel Remixes, Roberts' use of Jackson's voice performing "In Da Club," as well as of Jackson's stage name in the track title identifying that song, violated Jackson's right of publicity under Connecticut common law.The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Jackson's claim is preempted under the doctrine of implied preemption. In this case, Jackson's Connecticut right of publicity claim does not seek to vindicate any substantial state interests distinct from those furthered by the copyright law, and the policy considerations justifying the doctrine of implied preemption prevail.In the alternative, the court held that Jackson's claim as to the use of his voice on the mixtape is preempted by the express terms of section 301 of the Copyright Act. The court explained that the gravamen of Jackson's right of publicity claim, to the extent it is based on the use of the "In Da Club" sample, is not the use of his identity but rather the use of the copyrighted work itself, and that the focus of his claim therefore comes within the subject matter of copyright. Furthermore, to the extent that Jackson's right of publicity claim is based on the reproduction of a copyrighted work embodying Jackson's voice, that claim is preempted by section 301 because (1) its focus is Roberts' use of a work that falls within the "subject matter of copyright" and (2) it asserts rights that are sufficiently equivalent to the rights protected by federal copyright law. View "Jackson v. Roberts" on Justia Law