Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

DC filed suit against defendant, producer of replicas of the Batmobile, alleging, among other things, causes of action for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition arising from defendant’s manufacture and sale of the Batmobile replicas. The court concluded that the Batmobile, as it appears in the comic books, television series, and motion picture, is entitled to copyright protection. The court also concluded that the Batmobile character is the property of DC and that defendant infringed upon DC’s property rights when he produced unauthorized derivative works of the Batmobile as it appeared in the 1966 television show and the 1989 motion picture. Finally, the district court did not err when it ruled as a matter of law that defendant could not assert a laches defense to DC's trademark infringement claim because defendant willfully infringed on DC's trademarks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for DC on the copyright and trademark infringement claims. View "DC Comics v. Towle" on Justia Law

Rahn, a white male who earned a PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU. His wife, Regina, was hired as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering for that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in the Department. Rahn applied. Despite her husband’s status as an applicant, Regina was a voting member of the search committee. She claims that one committee member stated that he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority candidates were available. After another applicant was hired, the Rahns alleged reverse discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 701 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and copyright infringement, based on use of teaching notes and slides. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That testimony did not support indicate that an evaluation metric was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A university employer may properly preference academic experience; Rahn did not present evidence that such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description of the position and the preferred qualifications. View "Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging copyright infringement claims under 17 U.S.C. 501. Plaintiff holds the copyright to a candid photograph of himself which he considers unflattering and embarrassing. Defendant copied the photo into several scathing blog posts she wrote about plaintiff and his business practices. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant, arguing that the district court erred in finding defendant was entitled to summary judgment based on her affirmative defense that her use of the photo constituted fair use under 17 U.S.C. 107. The court concluded that the three factors in the court's fair use inquiry - the purpose and character of the work, the nature of the work, and the effect of the use on the potential market - weigh in favor of defendant; the amount and substantiality of the work is neutral; and after weighing all four factors, the court's analysis tilts strongly in favor of fair use. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant because every reasonable factfinder would conclude the inclusion of the photo in her blog posts constituted fair use. View "Katz v. Chevaldina" on Justia Law

After receiving takedown notification, YouTube removed plaintiff's video and sent her an email notifying her of the removal. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Universal under part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(f), alleging that Universal misrepresented in the takedown notification that her video constituted an infringing use of a portion of a composition by the Artist known as Prince, which Universal insists was unauthorized by the law. The court held that the DMCA requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a takedown notification, and that failure to do so raises a triable issue as to whether the copyright holder formed a subjective good faith belief that the use was not authorized by law. The court held, contrary to the district court's holding, that plaintiff may proceed under an actual knowledge theory in order to determine whether Universal knowingly misrepresented that it had formed a good faith belief that the video did not constitute fair use. The court held that the willful blindness doctrine may be used to determine whether a copyright holder "knowingly materially misrepresented[ed]" that it held a "good faith belief" the offending activity was not a fair use. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide evidence from which a juror could infer that Universal was aware of a high probability the video constituted fair use. Therefore, plaintiff may not proceed to trial on a willful blindness theory. The court also held that a plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages for an injury incurred as a result of a section 512(f) misrepresentation. In this case, plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages due to an unquantifiable harm suffered as a result of Universal’s actions. View "Lenz. Universal Music Corp." on Justia Law

Norbero Colon Lorenzana (Colon) was working for South American Restaurant Corporation (SARCO), a franchisee and operator of Church’s Chicken locations in Puerto Rico, when he suggested to his superiors the concept for a new chicken sandwich that could be included on Church’s menu. Church’s subsequently began selling the item, which it called the “Pechu Sandwich.” SARCO subsequently received a certificate of registration from the Puerto Rico Department of State trademarking the name “Pechu Sandwich” and also received a federal trademark registration for the name “Pechusandwich.” Colon brought suit alleging violations of the Lanham Act and Copyright Act. SARCO filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the district court granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that neither the name “Pechu Sandwich” nor the recipe are eligible for copyright protection; and (2) that Colon failed to sufficiently plead that SARCO committed fraud in the procurement of a federal trademark for the Pechu Sandwich. View "Colon-Lorenzana v. South American Restaurants Corp." on Justia Law

Varsity manufactures cheerleading and athletic apparel. Its designers sketch concepts: “original combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements which include V’s (chevrons), lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes,” but do not consider functionality or the ease of actually producing a uniform. Varsity decides whether to implement the completed design concept. Varsity advertises in catalogs and online, inviting customers to choose a design concept before selecting the shape, colors, and braiding for the uniform. Varsity received copyright registration for “two-dimensional artwork” for some designs. Star sells sports and cheerleading uniforms and advertised cheerleading uniforms that looked similar to five of Varsity’s registered designs. Varsity sued, alleging violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101. The court entered summary judgment in Star’s favor, concluding that Varsity’s designs were not copyrightable because their graphic elements are not physically or conceptually separable from the utilitarian function of a uniform because the “colors, stripes, chevrons, and similar designs” make the garment “recognizable as a cheerleading uniform.” The court did not address whether Varsity’s designs were unprotectable as unoriginal. The Sixth circuit reversed, finding that the graphic features of Varsity’s designs are more like fabric design than dress design, and are protectable subject matter under the Copyright Act View "Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC" on Justia Law

Cable operators’ retransmission of religious and devotional programming produced a pool of royalties that Congress charged the Copyright Royalty Judges with distributing to the copyright owners. In this appeal, Devotional Claimants argue that the Royalty Judges wrongly calculated their respective shares by allowing IPG to press claims without proper authority and refusing to accept Devotional Claimants' evidence regarding how the relative value of claims should be calculated. Devotional Claimants claim that, after the Royalty Judges rejected both their and IPG’s proposed methodologies, the Royalty Judges’ final allocation simply split the difference between the two parties, and that decision was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. The court agreed with Devotional Claimants' latter claim, concluding that the Royalty Judges are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The court affirmed the Royalty Judges’ procedural rulings resolving which IPG claims could go forward and whether the Devotional Claimants’ methodological evidence could be properly considered. View "Settling Devotional Claimants v. CRB" on Justia Law

IBS, a nonprofit association representing college and high school radio stations, appealed the determination by the Copyright Royalty Board setting royalty rates for webcasting. The court rejected IBS's contention that the Board’s determination violated the Appointments Clause because it was tainted by the previous Board’s decision. The court concluded that the Judges’ determination was an independent, de novo decision by a properly appointed panel seized with the full authority of the prior Board. This court has twice before considered the validity of decisions made after the replacement of an improperly appointed official and both cases support the validity of a subsequent determination when -- as here -- a properly appointed official has the power to conduct an independent evaluation of the merits and does so. Because neither this court’s vacatur order nor any statute bars the procedural approach the Board took on remand, the court rejected Intercollegiate’s claim that the Board’s approach contravened the court's order. The court also rejected IBS's challenge to the Board's determination on the merits because the Board's imposition of a $500 annual minimum fee for all noncommercial webcasters was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion and the Board acted reasonably in setting the fee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Intercollegiate Broadcasting v. CRB" on Justia Law

The Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles' estate, filed suit to challenge his heirs' purported termination of copyright grants that Charles conferred while he was alive. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the suit meets the threshold requirements of constitutional standing and ripeness, the argument that the Foundation may be a beneficial owner lends no support to its claim to standing; the Foundation is a real party in interest and has third-party standing; under the zone-of-interests test, the Foundation properly asserts its own claims where termination, if effective, would directly extinguish the Foundation’s right to receive prospective royalties from the current grant; and the Foundation is indeed a party whose injuries may have been proximately caused by violations of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "The Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Yellow Pages Group (YPG) appealed from a $123,000 judgment against it in favor of Yellow Pages Photos (YPPI) following a jury verdict in a copyright infringement trial. YPPI cross appealed, raising several claims of error. The court concluded that YPG meets the requirement that it possess standing to litigate this controversy, as it has a concrete and actual interest in avoiding a judgment being entered against it on YPPI’s copyright infringement claim, an interest that will be directly affected by the outcome of this appeal; YPG can nonetheless assert its defense even though it was not in privity of contract with YPPI; the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Ziplocal breached its contract with YPPI by transferring YPPI’s photos to YPG; the court found no merit in any of YPG’s contentions that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the End User License Agreement (EULA) was an invalid contract; and there were sufficient facts at trial to support a finding of willful infringement based on YPG’s reckless disregard for the possibility that it might be infringing on YPPI’s copyrights. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of YPG’s renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law. In regards to the cross-appeal, the court concluded that YPPI’s arguments lack merit and thus do not warrant a new trial on damages. View "Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Yellow Pages Group, LLC" on Justia Law