Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

After receiving takedown notification, YouTube removed plaintiff's video and sent her an email notifying her of the removal. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Universal under part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(f), alleging that Universal misrepresented in the takedown notification that her video constituted an infringing use of a portion of a composition by the Artist known as Prince, which Universal insists was unauthorized by the law. The court held that the DMCA requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a takedown notification, and that failure to do so raises a triable issue as to whether the copyright holder formed a subjective good faith belief that the use was not authorized by law. The court held, contrary to the district court's holding, that plaintiff may proceed under an actual knowledge theory in order to determine whether Universal knowingly misrepresented that it had formed a good faith belief that the video did not constitute fair use. The court held that the willful blindness doctrine may be used to determine whether a copyright holder "knowingly materially misrepresented[ed]" that it held a "good faith belief" the offending activity was not a fair use. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide evidence from which a juror could infer that Universal was aware of a high probability the video constituted fair use. Therefore, plaintiff may not proceed to trial on a willful blindness theory. The court also held that a plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages for an injury incurred as a result of a section 512(f) misrepresentation. In this case, plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages due to an unquantifiable harm suffered as a result of Universal’s actions. View "Lenz. Universal Music Corp." on Justia Law

Norbero Colon Lorenzana (Colon) was working for South American Restaurant Corporation (SARCO), a franchisee and operator of Church’s Chicken locations in Puerto Rico, when he suggested to his superiors the concept for a new chicken sandwich that could be included on Church’s menu. Church’s subsequently began selling the item, which it called the “Pechu Sandwich.” SARCO subsequently received a certificate of registration from the Puerto Rico Department of State trademarking the name “Pechu Sandwich” and also received a federal trademark registration for the name “Pechusandwich.” Colon brought suit alleging violations of the Lanham Act and Copyright Act. SARCO filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the district court granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly determined that neither the name “Pechu Sandwich” nor the recipe are eligible for copyright protection; and (2) that Colon failed to sufficiently plead that SARCO committed fraud in the procurement of a federal trademark for the Pechu Sandwich. View "Colon-Lorenzana v. South American Restaurants Corp." on Justia Law

Varsity manufactures cheerleading and athletic apparel. Its designers sketch concepts: “original combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements which include V’s (chevrons), lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes,” but do not consider functionality or the ease of actually producing a uniform. Varsity decides whether to implement the completed design concept. Varsity advertises in catalogs and online, inviting customers to choose a design concept before selecting the shape, colors, and braiding for the uniform. Varsity received copyright registration for “two-dimensional artwork” for some designs. Star sells sports and cheerleading uniforms and advertised cheerleading uniforms that looked similar to five of Varsity’s registered designs. Varsity sued, alleging violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101. The court entered summary judgment in Star’s favor, concluding that Varsity’s designs were not copyrightable because their graphic elements are not physically or conceptually separable from the utilitarian function of a uniform because the “colors, stripes, chevrons, and similar designs” make the garment “recognizable as a cheerleading uniform.” The court did not address whether Varsity’s designs were unprotectable as unoriginal. The Sixth circuit reversed, finding that the graphic features of Varsity’s designs are more like fabric design than dress design, and are protectable subject matter under the Copyright Act View "Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC" on Justia Law

Cable operators’ retransmission of religious and devotional programming produced a pool of royalties that Congress charged the Copyright Royalty Judges with distributing to the copyright owners. In this appeal, Devotional Claimants argue that the Royalty Judges wrongly calculated their respective shares by allowing IPG to press claims without proper authority and refusing to accept Devotional Claimants' evidence regarding how the relative value of claims should be calculated. Devotional Claimants claim that, after the Royalty Judges rejected both their and IPG’s proposed methodologies, the Royalty Judges’ final allocation simply split the difference between the two parties, and that decision was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. The court agreed with Devotional Claimants' latter claim, concluding that the Royalty Judges are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The court affirmed the Royalty Judges’ procedural rulings resolving which IPG claims could go forward and whether the Devotional Claimants’ methodological evidence could be properly considered. View "Settling Devotional Claimants v. CRB" on Justia Law

IBS, a nonprofit association representing college and high school radio stations, appealed the determination by the Copyright Royalty Board setting royalty rates for webcasting. The court rejected IBS's contention that the Board’s determination violated the Appointments Clause because it was tainted by the previous Board’s decision. The court concluded that the Judges’ determination was an independent, de novo decision by a properly appointed panel seized with the full authority of the prior Board. This court has twice before considered the validity of decisions made after the replacement of an improperly appointed official and both cases support the validity of a subsequent determination when -- as here -- a properly appointed official has the power to conduct an independent evaluation of the merits and does so. Because neither this court’s vacatur order nor any statute bars the procedural approach the Board took on remand, the court rejected Intercollegiate’s claim that the Board’s approach contravened the court's order. The court also rejected IBS's challenge to the Board's determination on the merits because the Board's imposition of a $500 annual minimum fee for all noncommercial webcasters was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion and the Board acted reasonably in setting the fee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Intercollegiate Broadcasting v. CRB" on Justia Law

The Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles' estate, filed suit to challenge his heirs' purported termination of copyright grants that Charles conferred while he was alive. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the suit meets the threshold requirements of constitutional standing and ripeness, the argument that the Foundation may be a beneficial owner lends no support to its claim to standing; the Foundation is a real party in interest and has third-party standing; under the zone-of-interests test, the Foundation properly asserts its own claims where termination, if effective, would directly extinguish the Foundation’s right to receive prospective royalties from the current grant; and the Foundation is indeed a party whose injuries may have been proximately caused by violations of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "The Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Yellow Pages Group (YPG) appealed from a $123,000 judgment against it in favor of Yellow Pages Photos (YPPI) following a jury verdict in a copyright infringement trial. YPPI cross appealed, raising several claims of error. The court concluded that YPG meets the requirement that it possess standing to litigate this controversy, as it has a concrete and actual interest in avoiding a judgment being entered against it on YPPI’s copyright infringement claim, an interest that will be directly affected by the outcome of this appeal; YPG can nonetheless assert its defense even though it was not in privity of contract with YPPI; the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Ziplocal breached its contract with YPPI by transferring YPPI’s photos to YPG; the court found no merit in any of YPG’s contentions that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the End User License Agreement (EULA) was an invalid contract; and there were sufficient facts at trial to support a finding of willful infringement based on YPG’s reckless disregard for the possibility that it might be infringing on YPPI’s copyrights. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of YPG’s renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law. In regards to the cross-appeal, the court concluded that YPPI’s arguments lack merit and thus do not warrant a new trial on damages. View "Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Yellow Pages Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Minden, a stock photography company, filed an infringement suit under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 501(b), against Wiley, a textbook publisher, alleging that Wiley had substantially exceeded the scope of the licenses granted by Minden. Minden claimed that Wiley published far more copies of books containing the photographs at issue than permitted under the licenses. At issue was whether Minden, as a licensing agent, has statutory standing under the Copyright Act to bring an infringement suit based on alleged violations of the terms of its licenses to Wiley. The court held that Minden may bring an infringement action to remedy the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, and display of the photographs by those to whom it has granted licenses because agency agreements convey the rights to reproduce, distribute, and display the photographs to Minden via an “exclusive license” to grant licenses to third parties. Accordingly, the court held that Minden has standing to sue under the Act and reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Minden Pictures v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. Ross Greene developed a method of treating children with explosive behaviors known as the Collaborative Problem Solving (CPS) approach and advanced this method through his work at the Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and through his publications, The Explosive Child, a book he wrote himself, and Treating Explosive Kids, a book he co-authored with Dr. J. Stuart Ablon. Greene alleged that MGH had infringed his CPS-related trademarks and that Ablon had infringed his CPS-related copyrights. MGH counterclaimed for ownership of the marks. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MGH. After a trial, the jury awarded $19,000 on Greene’s claim that Ablon infringed on The Explosive Child. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that none of Greene’s defenses to the enforcement of his employment contracts with MGH succeeded; (2) the district court erred in ruling that Treating Explosive Kids could not be both joint and derivative as a matter of law, but the error did not improperly circumscribe the evidence Greene could present on his copyright claim; (3) the district court properly determined that Greene was not entitled to an accounting or an injunction; and (4) the district court properly denied Ablon’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Greene v. General Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

SMI filed suit against BCS and ARGO, alleging violations of various Texas state law claims related to defendants' alleged theft of trade secrets in connection with a software program developed and sold by SMI. After removal to federal court, the district court denied SMI's motion to remand and subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court was correct to consider only the Original Petition when deciding SMI’s motion to remand; held that state law claims based on ideas fixed in tangible media are preempted by section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 301(a), and that the technical trade secrets found within VaultWorks fall within the subject matter of copyright; affirmed the district court’s denial of SMI’s motion to remand and held that it properly exercised jurisdiction over this action as a result of complete preemption by the Copyright Act; concluded that it would not be reasonable for a jury to infer that defendants used SMI’s trade secrets and therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of SMI’s claim of misappropriation of trade secrets; and concluded that SMI has waived its remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spear Marketing, Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank" on Justia Law