Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

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IPG, representative of several copyright owners in the 2000-03 royalty fee distribution proceeding, alleged that the Board erred in determining IPG's royalty fees in the sports programming and program suppliers categories. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the orders at issue are subject to judicial review as part of the Board’s final determination and therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review the merits of the appeal. The court concluded that an evidentiary sanction that the Board imposed during the preliminary evidentiary hearing is not arbitrary and capricious where the Board reasonably responded to a blatant discovery violation by IPG; no basis exists for overturning the Board’s reasoned decision to reject IPG’s sports programming claims on behalf of FIFA and the U.S. Olympic Committee; and the court rejected IPG's contentions that the Board improperly relied on the MPAA's methodology for calculating the relative marketplace value of their claims and allocating royalty fees within the program suppliers category. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Independent Producers Group v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a film director, producer, and editor, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a film production company, on its copyright and state-law claims related to the film entitled "Heads Up." At issue was whether a contributor to a creative work whose contributions are inseparable from, and integrated into, the work maintain a copyright interest in his or her contributions alone. Determining that the court had jurisdiction over the merits of the appeal, the court concluded that, on the facts of the present case, the Copyright Actʹs, 17 U.S.C. 102, terms, structure, and history support the conclusion that defendantʹs contributions to the film do not themselves constitute a ʺwork of authorshipʺ amenable to copyright protection. The court concluded that a directorʹs contribution to an integrated ʺwork of authorshipʺ such as a film is not itself a ʺwork of authorshipʺ subject to its own copyright protection. Therefore, defendant did not obtain and does not possess a copyright in his directorial contributions to the finished film. The court agreed with the district court that in this case, plaintiff was the dominant author of the film and concluded that plaintiff owns the copyright in the finished film and its prior versions, including the disputed ʺraw film footage.ʺ Finally, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that defendant's interference with plaintiff's planned screening and post-screening reception constituted tortious interference under New York law. Rather, the court concluded that the undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in defendantʹs favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions and for the district court to reexamine its award of costs and attorneyʹs fees, and for such other proceedings as are warranted. View "16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin" on Justia Law

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Bell, a lawyer and photographer, alleged that three small Indianapolis business owners violated federal copyright laws and an Indiana theft statute by publishing on the internet a photo that he took of the Indianapolis skyline without his authorization. In August 2013, the district court set a deadline for filing motions for leave to amend the pleadings. Bell sought to amend his complaint (for a fourth time) eight months after the cut-off after learning that defendant Taylor had not actually used the photo at issue but had displayed a different photo belonging to Bell. The district court denied Bell’s motion, citing undue delay and his own carelessness. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on the damages issue, finding that Bell cannot demonstrate how they caused him financial harm and was not entitled to monetary recovery. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although the court purported to issue a “final judgment” after ruling on the summary judgment motion, it did so in error; the issue of injunctive relief was never adjudicated. Because Bell’s copyright claim was not entirely disposed of by the ruling, the judgment was not final. View "Bell v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a Maine limited liability company, sought a preliminary injunction in state court that would forbid Defendant, one of Plaintiff’s former independent contractors, from publishing any company-owned content on her new website. The Maine superior court granted Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion and denied Defendant’s motion to reconsider. Defendant then removed the case to federal court. Defendant filed a notice of interlocutory appeal before the district court ruled on the merits of the state court injunction or issued any order enforcing, dissolving, or modifying the injunction. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that because the state court entered the preliminary injunction before the case was removed to federal court, and the federal court did not then adopt or otherwise rule on the state court’s order before Defendant filed this appeal, the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Concordia Partners LLC v. Pick" on Justia Law

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HPA filed suit against Lessard, Clark, Penrose, and Northwestern, alleging that the design, development, ownership, and construction of Two Park Crest, an apartment building in McLean, Virginia, infringed HPA’s architectural copyright embodied in Grant Park, a condominium building in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, primarily because no reasonable jury could find that the Grant Park and Two Park Crest designs are substantially similar. The court concluded that the district court did not err in considering expert reports where the reports were were sworn to in declarations; at bottom, HPA failed to carry its burden of identifying a specific similarity between the Two Park Crest design and the protected elements of its Grant Park design; because HPA failed to present nonconclusory evidence that the designs are extrinsically similar, the court rejected HPA’s claim that the district court failed to credit its extrinsic-similarity evidence; and the court rejected HPA's claims that the district court misapplied relevant copyright law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Humphreys & Partners Architects v. Lessard Design, Inc." on Justia Law

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Devin Copeland, a musician, filed suit under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., against Justin Bieber and Usher Raymond IV, alleging that three recorded songs by defendants, each titled "Somebody to Love," infringe upon Copeland's copyright over his own, earlier song of the same name. On appeal, Copeland challenged the dismissal of his claim. The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Copeland's song and defendants' songs sufficiently similar to give rise to liability for infringement. At issue was whether the songs at issue, assessed from the perspective of the intended audience - here, the general public - and taking into account their “total concept and feel,” are sufficiently intrinsically similar to give rise to a valid infringement claim. After listening to the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs as wholes, the court concluded that their choruses are similar enough and also significant enough that a reasonable jury could find the songs intrinsically similar. Further, the choruses of the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs are sufficiently important to the songs’ overall effect that they may be the basis for a finding of intrinsic similarity. The court declined to reach Copeland’s other arguments. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Copeland v. Bieber" on Justia Law

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After plaintiff, an artist, prevailed on a contributory copyright infringement claim against ELW, a publisher of her artwork, the district court awarded her attorney fees under a fee-shifting provision contained in the parties' publishing contract. Both parties appealed. Primarily at issue was whether the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., precluded enforcement of a contractual attorney fees provision in copyright-based litigation. The court concluded that the Copyright Act does not bar an award of attorney fees under the circumstances but held that the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding the majority of plaintiff’s requested fees without adequate explanation. The court affirmed the district court’s pretrial order setting the issues for trial and affirm its orders denying plaintiff’s motions for sanctions and for leave to amend. The court concluded that, although the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees, the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding the majority of plaintiff’s requested fees and failing to provide an adequate explanation for its calculations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Ryan v. Editions Ltd. West" on Justia Law

Posted in: Copyright
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Mannington Mills, Inc. appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Home Legend, LLC, that Mannington’s registered copyright in its “Glazed Maple” design was invalid. Mannington and Home Legend both sold laminate wood flooring. The copyright at issue in this case covers Mannington’s decor paper design called “Glazed Maple,” which is a huge digital photograph depicting fifteen stained and apparently time-worn maple planks. That appearance was only an appearance. In 2008, three Mannington employees created the Glazed Maple design not from aged planks but from raw wood. The team did not seek out an actual aged wood floor from which to create the design but instead “envision[ed what] a floor could look like after” twenty or thirty years, including the effects “age and wear and patina” might have on the planks. The United States Register of Copyrights registered Mannington’s copyright in its Glazed Maple design in November 2010. In September 2012, Mannington discovered that its competitor Home Legend was selling laminate flooring products with designs that it alleges were “virtually identical in every respect” to the Glazed Maple design. Mannington requested that Home Legend stop selling the allegedly infringing products. Home Legend responded by filing suit in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Mannington’s copyright was invalid. Mannington counterclaimed for copyright infringement and moved for a preliminary injunction, a motion that the district court denied. At the close of discovery, Home Legend moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mannington’s registered Glazed Maple copyright did not cover copyright-eligible subject matter. The district court granted summary judgment to Home Legend on three alternative grounds. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding: Mannington owned a valid copyright, "even if the protection that copyright affords it is not particularly strong." Because much of the expression in Mannington’s finished Glazed Maple design still reflected the uncopyrightable features of each plank, Mannington’s copyright gives it the limited protection of a derivative work. View "Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Copyright
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Steve "Wild Thing" Ray wrestled in the Universal Wrestling Federation (UWF) from 1990 to 1994. His matches were filmed. Ray specifically agreed that the films would be "sold and used." Since his retirement from the UWF, Ray has promoted healthcare products and weightlifting supplements. ESPN obtained films of his wrestling matches and re-telecast them throughout North America and Europe without obtaining his "consent to use [his] identity, likeness, name, nick name, or personality to depict him in any way." Ray does not allege that ESPN obtained the films unlawfully. Ray filed suit, asserting, under Missouri state law: invasion of privacy, misappropriation of name, infringement of the right of publicity, and interference with prospective economic advantage. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal on the grounds of preemption by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101. Ray's wrestling performances were part of the copyrighted material, and his likenesses could not be detached from the copyrighted performances contained in the films. Ray has not alleged that his name and likeness were used to promote or endorse any type of commercial product. His complaints are based solely on ESPN airing video recordings depicting him in a "work of authorship," which is plainly encompassed by copyright law. View "Ray v. ESPN, Inc." on Justia Law

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Haydel Enterprises appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nola Spice Designs and Raquel Duarte on claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, trademark dilution, copyright infringement, and unfair trade practices. Haydel Enterprises owns Haydel’s Bakery in New Orleans, which makes and sells pastries and cakes, including a popular king cake. In 2008, Haydel commissioned an artist to design a mascot, which was named “Mardi Gras Bead Dog.” On October 13, 2009, and December 1, 2009, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued two trademark registrations to Haydel for, respectively, the phrase “MARDI GRAS BEAD DOG” and its bead dog design. Both registrations cover king cake pastries, jewelry, and clothing. Haydel sold these items in its New Orleans store, online, and through a licensee. In September 2012, Haydel obtained a certificate of copyright registration for its work titled “Bead Dog” in “photograph(s), jewelry design, 2-D artwork, sculpture.” In May 2012, Raquel Duarte formed Nola Spice Designs, which sold jewelry and accessories, including necklaces and earrings featuring bead dog trinkets. Haydel learned of Duarte’s bead dogs through Haydel’s customers. In August 2012, Haydel sent Nola Spice Designs a letter noting Haydel’s trademark and copyright in “the bead dog design,” and demanding, inter alia, that Nola Spice Designs “remove from [its] website all display, mention of or reference to the bead dog design,” and “cease any and all promotion, sale, and/or use” of materials incorporating the bead dog design. In October 2012, Nola Spice Designs filed a complaint against Haydel seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that Nola Spice Designs’s activities do not violate the Lanham Act or any other trademark law; (2) the cancellation of Haydel’s trademarks; and (3) damages for unfair trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”). Haydel asserted counterclaims against Nola Spice Designs and filed a third-party complaint against Duarte, seeking injunctive relief and damages. The parties also filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Nola Spice on its claim for a declaratory judgment that it was not infringing Haydel’s trademarks, and the court cancelled those trademarks as unprotectable, but it denied Nola Spice’s motion for summary judgment on its LUTPA claims. The district court also granted summary judgment to Nola Spice on Haydel’s claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, trademark dilution, copyright infringement, and unfair trade practices. Haydel timely appealed the district court’s order. Nola Spice did not appeal the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of its LUTPA claim. Upon review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nola Spice on its claim for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Haydel’s trademarks, and affirmed the district court’s cancellation of those trademarks. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nola Spice on Haydel’s claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act; trademark dilution under Louisiana law; copyright infringement under the Copyright Act; and unfair trade practices under LUTPA. View "Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C., et al v. Haydel Enterp" on Justia Law

Posted in: Copyright, Trademark