Justia Copyright Opinion Summaries

Scholz Design created technical drawings for three homes and submitted them to the Copyright Office in 1988 and 1989 with front elevation drawings showing the front of the houses surrounded by lawn, bushes, and trees. Scholz obtained copyrights. In 1992 Scholz entered an agreement permitting Sart to build homes using the plans, for a fee of $1 per square foot of each house built. The agreement required that Sard not "copy or duplicate any of the [Scholz] materials nor . . . [use them] in any manner to advertise or build a [Scholz Design] or derivative except under the terms and conditions of the agreement." Scholz claimed that after termination of the agreement, Sard and real estate companies posted copies of the drawings on advertising websites and sued for violation of copyrights, 15 U.S.C. 1051, breach of contract, and violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 1201. The district court dismissed, finding that the copied images did not fulfill the intrinsic function of an architectural plan. The Second Circuit reversed. Architectural technical drawings might be subject to copyright protection even if they are not sufficiently detailed to allow for construction. View "Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "This appeal reads like a telenovela, a Spanish soap opera. It pits music celebrities, who make money by promoting themselves, against a gossip magazine, that makes money by publishing celebrity photographs, with a paparazzo, who apparently stole the disputed pictures, stuck in the middle." Noelia Monge and Jorge Reynoso ("the couple"), Latin American celebrities, claimed that Maya Magazines, Inc. and Maya Publishing Group, LLC (collectively, "Maya") infringed their copyrights by publishing previously unpublished photos of their clandestine wedding in "TVNotas," a Spanish-language celebrity gossip magazine. The district court granted Maya summary judgment on the ground that publication of the images was fair use under the Copyright Act of 1976. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Maya did not sustain its burden of establishing that its wholesale, commercial use of the previously unpublished photos constituted fair use, and thus, the district court should have granted the couple's summary judgment motion on this issue. Remanded. View "Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eastern Orthodox monastic order began a spiritual affiliation with the bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR)in 1965. Although the Monastery concedes it commemorated the bishops of ROCOR until 1986, it considers itself an independent entity. The Monastery's 35 monks worked on translating religious texts from their original Greek into English. The works were in demand amongst parishes, but the Monastery obliged requests on a limited basis. One of the monks went to Colorado where he formed Dormition Skete, dedicated to painting traditional Orthodox icons. A Skete member, the Archbishop, created a website devoted to the Orthodox faith. Based on postings on that site, the Monastery sued the Archbishop, in state court, for copyright infringement. The parties settled with the Archbishop acknowledging the Monastery’s ownership of the works. The website continued to include its translations; the Monastery filed a federal suit, 17 U.S.C. 101. The district ruled in favor of the Monastery, rejecting claims or public domain, that ROCOR was the true owner of the copyrights, and of fair use. The First Circuit affirmed. The Archbishop offered identical or near-identical versions of the works on his website for the precise purpose for which the Monastery originally created them, harming their potential market value. View "Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Denver" on Justia Law

Flava, which specializes in production and distribution of videos of black men engaged in homosexual acts, obtained a preliminary injunction against myVidster, an online social bookmarking service by which people refer sites to those with similar tastes, based on a finding that myVidster is a contributory infringer. The Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction. A Flava customer is authorized only to download the video for his personal use. If instead he uploaded it to the Internet and so by doing so created a copy (because the downloaded video remains in his computer), he was infringing. The court remanded for determination of whether myVidster was a contributory infringer if a visitor to its website bookmarks the video and later someone clicks on the bookmark and views the video. View "Flava Works, Inc v. Marques Rondale Gunter, et al" on Justia Law

Art Etc., LLC sought a declaratory judgment that the sale of inventory purchased from Angel Gifts, Inc. and Donald Schmit would amount to copyright infringement in violation of the United States Copyright Act. Angel Gifts and Donald Schmit moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, invoking an arbitration provision in an agreement between the parties. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the parties intended for the arbitration provision to apply only under certain circumstances; and (2) Art. Etc.'s claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. Thus, arbitration in this case was not required. View "Art Etc. LLC v. Angel Gifts, Inc." on Justia Law

Evan Stone, counsel for Plaintiff, appealed sanctions imposed on him. The underlying case involved Plaintiff's lawsuit alleging copyright infringement against 670 persons who allegedly unlawfully downloaded Plaintiff's film using an online file-sharing program. After the case had been dismissed, Defendants, through attorneys ad litem, moved for sanctions based on Stone's misconduct in violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 45 by issuing subpoenas to Defendants' ISPs. The district court granted the sanctions motion, finding that Stone had issued subpoenas in violation of court order, thereby grossly abusing his subpoena power. The Does, through the attorneys ad litem, then moved the court to impose further sanctions based on Stone's failure to comply with the first sanctions order. The court granted the motion for additional sanctions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions imposed by the district court, holding (1) all the issues Stone raised on appeal had been waived; and (2) no miscarriage of justice would result from the sanctions imposed. View "Mick Haig Prods. E.K. v. Does 1-670" on Justia Law

In 2005, Forest Park formulated a concept for a television show called "Housecall," in which a doctor, after being expelled from the medical community for treating patients who could not pay, moved to Malibu, California, and became a concierge doctor to the rich and famous. Forest Park created character biographies, themes, and storylines, which it mailed to Sepiol, who worked for USA Network. Initial discussions failed. A little less than four years later, USA Network produced and aired a television show called "Royal Pains," in which a doctor, after being expelled from the medical community for treating patients who could not pay, became a concierge doctor to the rich and famous in the Hamptons. Forest Park sued USA Network for breach of contract. The district court held that the claim was preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.101, and dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed. Forest Park adequately alleged the breach of a contract that included an implied promise to pay; the claim is based on rights that are not the equivalent of those protected by the Copyright Act and is not preempted. View "Forest Park Pictures v. USA Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim under Colorado law for civil theft of a copyrightable work required a trial court to instruct the jury on principles of federal copyright law. Petitioner Steward Software hired Respondent Richard Kopcho to develop and market a new software program. Steward never entered into a written agreement governing the ownership of the software with Holonyx, Inc. (one of Respondent's multiple corporate entities) or Respondent. By the time the software was ready for testing, the relationship between the parties had become strained. Steward refused to make further payments and under Respondent's direction, Holonyx locked Steward out of the software code and refused to turn it over. Holonyx then filed a copyright registration for the software with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the software's author a new corporation Respondent controlled called Ruffdogs Software, Inc. Steward sued Respondent for breach of contract and civil theft. Before trial, the parties tendered proposed jury instructions; one of Steward's proposed instructions pertained to the ownership and registration of copyrightable works. The trial court determined that copyright law did not pertain to Steward's civil theft claim and rejected the tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that ownership of the copyright in the code was irrelevant. The Court thus concluded the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the principles of copyright law. The court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's opinion. View "Steward Software Co. v. Kopcho" on Justia Law

In these parallel cases, separate petitions were filed requesting the district court to set a "reasonable" rate after ASCAP and BMI were unable to agree on licensing fees with DMX, a provider of background/foreground music. In both cases, the district court adopted DMX's proposals. The court held the Second Amended Final Judgment (AFJ2) permitted blanket licenses subject to carve-outs to account for direct licensing and the court rejected ASCAP's claim that a blanket license with an adjustable carve-out conflicted with the AJF2. The court concluded that the district court in both cases found that ASCAP and BMI did not sustain their burdens of proving that their proposals were reasonable; no legal error contributed to these findings and the findings supported by the record were not clearly erroneous; and in both instances, the district court had the authority to set a reasonable rate for DMX's licenses. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in setting DMX's licensing rates with ASCAP and BMI and that the rates set by the district court were reasonable. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc.; American Society of Computers, Authors and Publishers v. THP Capstar Acquisition Corp." on Justia Law

The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 17 U.S.C. 106(4), including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate ... the [copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times,” section 101. Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet. Aereo’s server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by an antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder and streams the show to the subscriber, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast. The owners of program copyrights unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to “perform” their copyrighted works “publicly.” The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Aereo performs the works within the meaning of section 101 and does not merely supply equipment that allows others to do so. The Court noted that the Act was amended in 1976 to make the law applicable to community antenna television (CATV) providers by clarifying that an entity that acts like a CATV system “performs,” even when it only enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals. Aereo’s activities are similar; it sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast. That Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program is not critical. Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers watch a program. The Court stated that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it “transmit[s] ... a performance” to them, regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes and whether it makes an individual personal copy for each viewer. Aero subscribers are “the public” under the Act: a large number of people, unrelated and unknown to each other. View "Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law