Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act to allow U.S. nationals to seek compensation for property confiscated by the Castro regime in Cuba. Odette Blanco de Fernandez and her siblings' heirs and estates alleged that Seaboard Marine trafficked in property confiscated from their family’s companies, Azucarera Mariel, S.A. and Maritima Mariel, S.A., by shipping goods to a container terminal on the west side of Mariel Bay. The district court granted summary judgment for Seaboard, concluding that Fernandez failed to present evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated land.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the claims of Fernandez’s siblings' heirs and estates, ruling they could not bring a claim under the Act because the siblings died after the statutory bar date of March 12, 1996. However, the court allowed Fernandez’s claims to proceed. The district court later granted summary judgment for Seaboard, holding that Fernandez did not provide sufficient evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the siblings' heirs and estates' claims, citing the statutory bar date. The court also affirmed the summary judgment regarding Maritima’s 1955 concession, agreeing that it did not grant exclusive rights to exploit the entirety of Mariel Bay. However, the court reversed the summary judgment concerning Azucarera’s confiscated land, finding that Fernandez presented sufficient evidence that Seaboard’s commercial activities benefited from the confiscated property. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Seaboard benefited from the confiscated land by using the terminal built on it. The case was affirmed in part and reversed in part, allowing Fernandez’s claim regarding Azucarera’s land to proceed. View "De Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd." on Justia Law

Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia, a leader of the Mexican drug-trafficking organization Los Cuinis, coordinated shipments of tens of thousands of kilograms of cocaine into the United States over a decade. He used various methods to conceal the drugs and employed violence and threats of violence in his operations. In 2016, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. He was arrested in Uruguay, where he fought extradition for four years. Despite his arguments against extradition based on the potential for a life sentence in the U.S., he was eventually extradited without any assurances from the U.S. regarding his sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Gonzalez-Valencia to life imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge without a plea agreement. The court calculated his base offense level and applied several enhancements, resulting in a recommendation of life imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines. Gonzalez-Valencia appealed his sentence, raising procedural and substantive claims, including objections to his criminal history category and the application of sentencing enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Gonzalez-Valencia's objections to the sentencing enhancements did not constitute plain error and that his argument regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause was not supported by clear legal precedent. The court also rejected his claim that the district court was required to comply with Uruguay's condition against a life sentence, noting that the U.S. made no such assurances. The court affirmed the district court's sentence, concluding that there was no reversible error or grounds for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia" on Justia Law

Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

Realtek Semiconductor Corporation appealed a decision by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) regarding a motion for sanctions against DivX, LLC. DivX had filed a complaint alleging a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by Realtek and others, which was later withdrawn. Realtek then sought sanctions against DivX for alleged misconduct occurring months prior. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the motion on procedural grounds, and the ITC adopted this decision without comment.Realtek petitioned for the ITC to issue a show cause order sua sponte, which the ITC declined to do. Realtek argued that the ITC's failure to issue the order violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The ITC and DivX contended that the appeal should be dismissed due to lack of standing, jurisdiction, and because the decision was unreviewable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the ITC's decision not to issue a show cause order sua sponte was within its discretion and thus unreviewable under the APA. The court noted that such decisions are committed to agency discretion by law and are not subject to judicial review. Consequently, the court dismissed Realtek's appeal. View "REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law

Vandewater International Inc. requested a scope ruling from the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine if its steel branch outlets were subject to an antidumping duty order on "butt-weld pipe fittings" from China. Vandewater argued that its products did not meet the definition of "butt-weld pipe fittings" as they had contoured ends and were used differently. Commerce determined that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order, leading to an appeal.The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and initially found that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous, requiring further analysis. The CIT remanded the case to Commerce to conduct a full scope inquiry using the (k)(2) criteria, which include physical characteristics, expectations of purchasers, ultimate use, channels of trade, and manner of advertisement. Commerce reaffirmed its decision that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order based on these criteria.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous and that Commerce's determination using the (k)(2) criteria was supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the (k)(1) sources were not dispositive in determining whether Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order. Additionally, the court dismissed SCI's challenge to Commerce's suspension of liquidation instructions as moot, as there were no unliquidated entries of Vandewater's products before the relevant date. View "Vandewater International Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Lashify, Inc., an American company, distributes and sells eyelash extensions and related products in the United States, which are manufactured abroad. Lashify holds patents on these products and filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that other importers were infringing on its patents, specifically a utility patent (U.S. Patent No. 10,721,984) and two design patents (U.S. Design Patent Nos. D877,416 and D867,664). Lashify sought relief under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which requires the existence of a domestic industry related to the patented articles.The ITC denied Lashify relief, ruling that Lashify failed to meet the economic-prong requirement of the domestic-industry test, which demands significant investment in plant and equipment, significant employment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in exploitation of the patents. The ITC excluded expenses related to sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, and distribution, deeming them insufficient to establish a domestic industry. Additionally, the ITC found that Lashify's products did not satisfy the technical-prong requirement for the utility patent, as the products did not meet the "heat fused" claim limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Lashify that the ITC applied an incorrect legal standard for the economic-prong requirement. The court held that significant employment of labor or capital should include expenses related to sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, and distribution. The court vacated the ITC's decision on the economic prong and remanded for reevaluation regarding the design patents. However, the court affirmed the ITC's finding that Lashify failed to satisfy the technical-prong requirement for the utility patent, upholding the construction of "heat fused" to mean joined to form a single entity. View "LASHIFY, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law

Appellants, including GL B Energy Corporation and others, were accused of transshipping xanthan gum from China through India to evade antidumping duties imposed by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) initiated an investigation based on allegations from CP Kelco U.S., a domestic producer, and found substantial evidence that the xanthan gum was of Chinese origin and subject to antidumping duties. Customs applied adverse inferences against the manufacturers for not cooperating with information requests, concluding that the merchandise was transshipped to evade duties.The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and affirmed Customs' determinations. The CIT dismissed claims related to finally liquidated entries for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the importers failed to timely appeal the denial of their protests. The CIT also denied the remaining motions for judgment on the agency record, finding that Customs' determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the CIT that Customs' evasion determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were in accordance with the law. The court also found that the CIT had jurisdiction to review the evasion determinations, even for finally liquidated entries, based on the precedent set in Royal Brush Mfg., Inc. v. United States. However, the court affirmed the CIT's decision, noting that the CIT would have denied the motions for judgment on the agency record for the same reasons stated for the other entries. The court concluded that Customs' evasion determinations were lawful and supported by substantial evidence. View "ALL ONE GOD FAITH, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Jewish survivors of the Hungarian Holocaust and their heirs sued Hungary and its national railway (MÁV) in federal court, seeking damages for property allegedly seized during World War II. They claimed that Hungary and MÁV liquidated the expropriated property, commingled the proceeds with other government funds, and later used funds from those commingled accounts in connection with commercial activities in the United States.The District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the plaintiffs' "commingling theory" satisfied the commercial nexus requirement of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation exception. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that requiring plaintiffs to trace the particular funds from the sale of their specific expropriated property to the United States would make the exception a "nullity" in cases involving liquidated property.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs must trace either the specific expropriated property itself or any property exchanged for such property to the United States. The Court vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hungary v. Simon" on Justia Law

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Hussein v. Maait" on Justia Law

US Synthetic Corp. (USS) filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (Commission) alleging that several intervenors violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by importing and selling products that infringe five of USS’s patents. The focus of this appeal is U.S. Patent No. 10,508,502 (’502 patent), which claims a polycrystalline diamond compact (PDC) with specific structural and magnetic properties.The Commission instituted an investigation, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the asserted claims of the ’502 patent were infringed and not invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, or 112. However, the ALJ found the claims patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as they were directed to an abstract idea. The Commission reviewed and affirmed the ALJ’s determination, concluding that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of achieving desired magnetic properties, which were seen as side effects of the manufacturing process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the asserted claims of the ’502 patent are not directed to an abstract idea but to a specific, non-abstract composition of matter defined by its constituent elements, dimensional information, and quantified material properties. The court found that the magnetic properties are integrally related to the structure of the PDC and are not merely side effects. Therefore, the claims are not directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one, and the court did not reach Alice step two.The court also addressed the alternative argument that the claims were not enabled. The court found no error in the Commission’s conclusion that the claims were enabled, as the respondents failed to prove a lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence. The court reversed the Commission’s conclusion on patent ineligibility, affirmed the enablement conclusion, and remanded the case. View "US SYNTHETIC CORP. v. ITC " on Justia Law